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ABSTRACT 
Agency theory predicts that corporate governance (CG) and audit quality (AQ) 
enhance the convergence of interests between shareholders and managers and enable 
investors and lenders to have better perception on the optimum level of cost of debt capital. 
However, there is a lack of studies that investigate this issue in the emerging markets, 
particularly in Malaysia. Therefore, this research is conducted to investigate the relationship 
between internal monitoring characteristics of board of director and audit committee relating 
to the size, independence, financial expertise, frequency of meeting, ethnicity and education 
of directors and ethnicity of chairperson, and AQ as proxies by audit fees, non-audit service 
fees and industry specialist auditor, as external monitoring on the cost of debt capital. This 
study reports the results of  multivariate analysis on dataset that were obtained from the 
Bursa Malaysia, DataStream, Bloomberg and annual reports of firms between 2003 and 
2012. The empirical results of this study indicate that larger size and independent non-
executive directors with less frequent directors’ meeting, ethnicity of Malay directors on the 
board, larger size and more frequent meeting of audit committee have significant effects on 
reducing the agency problem with internal monitoring function. These lead to a reduction in 
the cost of raising fund from lenders in capital market. The results also indicate that hiring 
industry specialist auditors and using non-audit services of external auditors have remarkable 
influence on reducing the information asymmetry with external monitoring function, which 
help to lower the cost of debt capital in the capital market. Findings are consistent with the 
agency theory, signaling theory and cultural theory, whereby internal and external CG 
mechanisms are associated with effective monitoring, which in turn helps to lower 
information asymmetry and agency problem in capital markets and consequently increases 
potential investors and lenders. The findings are of potential interest to policy makers, board 
members, audit committee members and external auditors. 
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ABSTRAK 
Teori agensi meramalkan tadbir urus korporat (CG) dan kualiti audit (AQ) 
mempertingkatkan penyatuan antara kepentingan pemegang saham dengan kepentingan 
pengurus serta memperbaiki persepsi pelabur dan pemberi pinjaman tentang aras kos modal 
hutang yang optimum. Namun, tidak banyak kajian dilakukan untuk mengkaji isu ini dalam 
pasaran yang semakin berkembang, khususnya di Malaysia. Oleh sebab itu, kajian ini 
dijalankan untuk meneliti hubungan antara ciri-ciri pemantauan dalaman lembaga pengarah 
dan jawatankuasa audit dalam hal yang berkaitan dengan saiz, ketakbersandaran, kepakaran 
kewangan, kekerapan mesyuarat, etnik dan pendidikan pengarah dan etnik pengerusi, dan 
AQ  yang diproksi oleh fi audit, fi perkhidmatan bukan audit dan juruaudit pakar industri, 
sebagai pemantauan luaran bagi kos modal hutang. Penyelidikan ini melaporkan keputusan 
analisis multivariat bagi set data yang diperoleh daripada Bursa Malaysia, DataStream, 
Bloomberg dan laporan tahunan syarikat dari tahun 2003 hingga tahun 2012. Keputusan 
empirikal daripada kajian ini menunjukkan pengarah bukan eksekutif dengan bilangan ahli 
yang lebih besar dan bebas serta menjalankan mesyuarat pengarah dengan kurang kerap, 
lembaga pengarah beretnik Melayu, jawatankuasa audit dengan bilangan ahli yang lebih 
besar dan menjalankan mesyuarat dengan lebih kerap mempunyai kesan ketara dalam 
mengurangkan masalah agensi dengan fungsi pemantauan dalaman. Hal ini membawa 
kepada pengurangan kos bagi mendapatkan pembiayaan daripada pemberi pinjaman dalam 
pasaran modal. Keputusan ini juga menunjukkan bahawa pengambilan juruaudit pakar 
industri dan penggunaan perkhidmatan bukan audit daripada juruaudit luar mempunyai 
kesan yang ketara dalam mengurangkan maklumat yang tidak bersimetri dengan fungsi 
pemantauan luaran, yang seterusnya membantu mengurangkan kos modal hutang dalam 
pasaran modal. Dapatan ini konsisten dengan teori agensi, teori isyarat dan teori budaya, 
iaitu mekanisme CG dalaman dan luaran berkait rapat dengan pemantauan berkesan yang 
seterusnya membantu mengurangkan keasimetrian maklumat dan masalah agensi dalam 
pasaran modal lalu menambahkan bilangan bakal pelabur dan peminjam. Dapatan ini 
mungkin penting kepada penggubal dasar, ahli lembaga pengarah, ahli jawatankuasa audit 
dan juruaudit luar.  
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  CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview 
This chapter provides study outline, which is comprised of eleven sections: 
Section 1.2 provides the research background. Section 1.3 discusses the problem 
statements, while sections 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6 focus on the research questions, the 
research objectives, and the significance and contributions of the study. Section 1.7 
highlights the scope of the study. Sections 1.8, 1.9, 1.0 and 1.11 methodologies, 
limitation of study, thesis outline, and the terminology used.  
1.2 Background of Research 
Cost of debt is one of the burdens a company can be exposed to as it raises  
debt ; this cost is reflected in the interest charged on the money borrowed, which is 
the amount of money the company pays for the privilege of using borrowed money 
to run or expand its business. It represent the interest that is paid on bank loans, bond 
options, and similar types of financial transactions (Ertugrul and Hegde, 2008). 
According to Abdulhafedh (2006), firms finance their activities using funds from 
debt and equity; however, most successful companies depend on debt more than 
equity fund. It is documented that the value of borrowing is much greater than equity 
funding only from its owners and companies with mixed financing (internally and 
externally) as having more weight in the marketplace than companies funded by 
owners. So, it has been argued that a healthy financial structure must consist of mix 
debt and equity leading to a lower weighted average cost of capital (Keown et al., 
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2001). However, the importance of debt as a source of funding for companies needs 
to be approached carefully because excessive debt could affect companies’ riskiness 
which would eventually negatively affect the shareholders wealth (Ertugrul and 
Hegde, 2008). 
It is well recognized that cost of debts is considered an important issue for all 
companies due to several reasons. Firstly, companies can manage their finance 
effectively when they obtain the best interest rate. Secondly, calculating the cost of 
debt capital as it applies to incurring more debt can assist companies to weigh the 
benefits of the potential action with the liabilities. Finally, evaluating properly the 
cost of debt will assist companies to determine effectively on whether to issue a bond 
to finance upcoming projects or not (Warga and Welch, 1993). Bhojraj and Sengupta 
(2003) indicate that companies can get low cost debts through a reduction in default 
risk due to reduced agency problems and improved monitoring of managerial actions 
when companies have stronger corporate governance. 
The number of accounting scandals in North America and Europe has 
increased between 1990 and the start of the 21st century. This period of time saw 
accounting fraud committed by organizations such as Enron, HealthSouth, Xerox, 
Parmalat, WorldCom, and Tyco (Njuguna and Moronge, 2013). These scandals have 
brought to light the importance of monitoring systems such as corporate governance 
(CG). CG does not directly impact the performance of a corporation nor does it 
directly influence the organization’s cost of raising funds. Instead, CG suggests 
solutions for agency problems that combines the interests of management and that of 
shareholders (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). The effectiveness of using CG as a 
monitoring system was confirmed by Gul and Tsui (2001). Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) pointed out that there may be conflicts 
between the interests of management and shareholders when  management roles are 
separated from that of shareholders. Therefore, different internal and external 
mechanisms have been considered via CG to prevent agency conflicts as well as to 
reduce costs associated with such agency. 
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CG mechanisms are classified into internal and external mechanism. The 
internal mechanisms include board of directors, audit committee, institutional 
shareholders, insider ownership, and dividend policy. Meanwhile, external 
mechanisms include takeover, product market competition, external auditors, 
managing labour market, mutual monitoring by managers, and the legal environment 
(Farinha, 2003). Regulators around the world are increasingly looking to set 
standards or codes of best practice for CG to attract more capital or foreign 
investment to the country (Agrawal and Chadha, 2005). For example, following the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX, 2002), the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and 
National Association of Corporate Directors (NASD) proposed a new corporate 
governance listing-standard, which was approved by Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) on November 4, 2003. The new listing standards include 
provisions regarding board structure, audit committee composition and 
responsibilities, and other CG matters. 
Consistent with other countries, Malaysia encourages listed firms to follow 
the best practices of CG. Two important governance internal mechanisms discussed 
in the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) are board of directors and 
audit committee, consistent with their significant role in overseeing the financial 
reporting process (Yatim et al., 2006). One of the important elements of internal CG 
mechanisms is the board of directors (Fama and Jensen, 1983b). As capital structure 
decisions are influenced by managers who prefer to have debt rather than equity 
financing (Myers, 2001), the board of directors serves as an important mechanism for 
monitoring management decisions  (Shamsher and Zulkarnain, 2011).  
The board’s primary function is to protect the shareholders’ interests. 
According to Limpaphayom and Connelly (2006), the role of board of directors in 
overseeing management is needed to check on management and to make sure that the 
management has complied with all rules. Of special relevance to this research is that  
board of directors’ characteristics such as board size, board independence, board 
meetings, financial expertise board and others are argued to play a role in influencing 
cost of debts (Anderson et al., 2004; El Dahrawy et al., 2015; Ertugrul and Hegde, 
2008; Pham et al., 2012).  
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The audit committee is a sub-committee of the board of directors, which 
assumes some of the board’s responsibilities (Menon and Deahl Williams, 1994). 
The main functions of an audit committee are to assume the  responsibility of 
appointing the external auditor, meet regularly with the external and internal auditors 
to review the financial statements, audit process and internal controls of the firm (Al-
Mamun et al., 2014; Yassin and Nelson, 2012). This helps to lessen agency problems 
by the timely release of unbiased accounting information by managers to 
shareholders and others who rely on (Al-Mamun et al., 2014). Existence of audit 
committee is considered while making investment in company. Hence, with the wide 
adoption of the audit committee scholars suggests that the audit committee is an 
important element of the system of CG (Anderson et al., 2004; Karamanou and 
Vafeas, 2005; Mangena and Pike, 2005; Yassin and Nelson, 2012). As widely 
recognized, the duties of the audit committees have been related to internal audit see 
for example (Raghunandan et al., 2001; Yassin and Nelson, 2012), financial 
reporting (Song and Windram, 2004), and external auditor (Archambeault and 
DeZoort, 2001; Carcello and Neal, 2003). These three interrelated duties are 
discharged to audit committees to ensure that financial statements and external 
filings fairly represent the financial results of the company and to enable independent 
verification of the efficiency of systems and controls. 
External auditors are one of the important external CG mechanisms. External 
audits focus on aligning the interests of both managers and shareholders while 
reducing the possibility of information asymmetry in the capital markets. According 
to Cohen et al (2007), an auditor is responsible for the reliability of financial reports 
in situations where the audit committee is symbolic but may retain the power to 
question management. The effectiveness of an external auditor lies in their ability to 
produce pertinent and dependable financial information that can be used to create 
accurate financial reports (Raedy and Helms, 2002). DeFond et al. (2005) claim that 
the importance of role played by independent external auditors has been highlighted 
by the accounting scandals of the last twenty years and their association to the 
monitoring role of CG.  
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Companies with quality information and lower information asymmetry attract 
more investors, which encourages the market to further discount the company’s 
future earnings thus improving its current value and gains for current investors. The 
most common proxies for a company’s value are its market and accounting 
performance. However, a new concept is emerging that assesses an organization’s 
value based on its capacity to profit from lower cost of raising fund provided by the 
dynamic mechanisms of CG (Donker and Zahir, 2008).  
Several researchers have documented that poor internal monitoring (board of 
directors and audit committees) and external monitoring (the quality of the audits 
conducted by external auditors) lead to increased information asymmetry, agency 
problems, and a higher cost of debt capital (Bliss and Gul, 2012; El Dahrawy et al., 
2015; Kim et al., 2011; Koerniadi and Tourani-Rad, 2011; Pham et al., 2012; Soha, 
2011). On the other hand, reductions in information asymmetry and agency problems 
result in decreased cost of debt capital in the capital market. Sound CG monitors 
managerial practice in dealing with debt financing. In its absence the cost of debt 
goes up and firms with high cost of raising  fund decrease the rate of return to lenders 
and investors, which in turn unfavorably affect public confidence in the reliability of 
corporate reporting in capital market (El Dahrawy et al., 2015; Koerniadi and 
Tourani-Rad, 2011; Pham et al., 2012). 
These claims show the significant role played by internal and external 
monitoring in investment decisions made by investors and lenders in the capital 
market. This study claims that companies with strong internal monitoring 
mechanisms consisting of boards of directors, audit committees, and external 
monitoring in the form of high quality external auditors will lower the cost of raising 
fund from lenders (debt) in capital market. In contrast, firms with poor internal and 
external CG monitoring are likely to engage in more cost of raising fund from 
lenders that often disregarding the interests of both the owners and the debt holders. 
This requires the participation of key players in CG systems, especially local CG 
systems such as the Bursa Malaysia, Securities Commission (SC), corporate boards, 
corporate advisors, auditors, and management to prevent further accounting scandals 
and restore the confidence of investors and lenders.  
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Board of directors characteristics, audit committee characteristics and quality 
of the audits conducted by external auditors are CG tools. They act as control 
mechanism to lower of agency problem and information asymmetry in capital 
market. Research on cost of debt and CG has been dominated by studies on 
developed countries. There is an increasing awareness that theories validated by 
research on developed countries such as the USA and the UK may have limited 
applicability to emerging markets. Emerging markets have different characteristics 
such as different political, economic and institutional conditions, which may limit the 
application of theoretical models used to explain behavior in developed markets. 
Malaysia as an emerging market provides an excellent setting for the study of the 
impact of CG. It differs from developed countries in respect of various institutional 
characteristics such as stronger political connections (Gul, 2006), significant 
government, family ownership of firms (Lemmon and Lins, 2003) and concentrated 
ownership (Claessens et al., 2000).  In more general terms, Malaysia provides a 
setting for robust examination of the role of internal and external CG on lower of 
cost of debt in capital market. The next section discusses the problem statements 
presented in this thesis. 
1.3 Problem Statements  
 
Firms finance their activities using a combination of debt and equity capital. 
However, most successful companies depend on debt more than equity fund  
(Abdulhafedh, 2006; Ertugrul and Hegde, 2008). It has also been argued that a 
healthy financial structure must consist of a mix of debt and equity that may lead to a 
lower weighted average cost of capital (Keown et al., 2001). However, the 
importance of debt as a source of funding for companies should  be approached 
carefully, because excessive debt could affect companies’ results, which would 
eventually affect the shareholders wealth (Ertugrul and Hegde, 2008). 
CG mechanisms are a way to protect the shareholders and lenders interest. 
Firms with stronger CG are expected to get external fund. The theoretical foundation 
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for the relationship between CG and cost of debt capital in this study is provided by 
the agency theory. The core of the agency theory is to resolve conflicts resulting 
from the separation of ownership and management control of corporate resources 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983b; Jensen, 1986). The existence of such conflicts of interest 
between owners and managers may affect the monitoring over company activity and 
information, which may consequently, increase the cost of raising fund in capital 
markets. Therefore, to control the conflict of interests and reduce agency costs, 
various internal and external tools, known as CG, have been suggested.  
A review of literature indicated that the quality and implementation of CG 
influences the cost of debt capital because high quality audits conducted by external 
auditors and the best practices of CG boost the confidence of managers, investors 
and lenders when making investment decisions. By contrast, as agency problems and 
information asymmetry increases, investors claim higher cost of debt capital because 
of the associated risks. On the other hand, the literature shows that poor quality 
external audit and weak CG leads to increased information asymmetry and agency 
problems, which ultimately leads to a higher cost of debt capital (Aldamen et al., 
2010; Ashbaugh-Skaife and LaFond, 2006; Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Bin-
Sariman et al., 2015; Cornaggia et al., 2015; Huguet and Gandía, 2014; 
Kholbadalov, 2012; Lou and Vasvari, 2009).  
Remarkably, most of the recently published research regarding CG and cost 
debt capital has focused primarily on U.S. and UK companies and other developed 
countries, with less attention being devoted to companies in emerging markets. 
Furthermore, most of the prior studies relating to internal CG and cost of debt capital  
have concentrated on ownership structures, voting rights, shareholder rights, and 
anti-takeover factors (Ashbaugh et al., 2004; Cheng et al., 2006; Farooq and Derrabi, 
2012; Klock et al., 2005; Regalli and Soana, 2012). Additionally, a review of the CG 
literature revealed that other important attributes can impact the perception of 
monitoring mechanisms held by shareholders and lenders because these attributes 
played a role in reducing information asymmetry and agency problems in the capital 
markets and consequently reduced cost of raising fund form lenders (debt) (Anderson 
et al., 2004; Cornaggia et al., 2015; El Dahrawy et al., 2015; Paige Fields et al., 
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2012; Upadhyay and Sriram, 2011). These attributes are classified as the 
effectiveness of the board of director and the effectiveness of audit committee. This 
includes internal monitoring by a boards of directors (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 
1983b) and audit committees (Pincus et al., 1990). However, little attention has been 
devoted to investigate the association between board of directors and audit 
committee characteristics (as a governance mechanism) and cost of debt capital 
particularly in emerging market such as Malaysia. 
The Malaysia Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) (2007 and 2012) for 
listed companies consider the role of board of directors to be an important 
mechanism for governance which protects investors from defaults and agency costs 
that company face when involve in financial transactions such as loans and others. 
Fama and Jensen (1983b) indicated that board of directors is one of the important 
mechanisms in internal CG mechanisms. Therefore, Klapper and Love (2004) argue 
that board of directors’ effectiveness lead to the protection of investors and lenders 
from the risks exposed as a result of borrowing from financial institutions, examples 
include defaults and increasing the cost of debt. Furthermore, Paige Fields et al. 
(2012) argue that board effectiveness may cause banks to have greater faith in 
internal governance mechanisms and thus reduce borrowing costs. More generally, 
the quality of the board may have a substantial impact on the cost of debt capital. 
Rajan (1992) argues that high quality boards, by better governance, may complement 
the monitoring role of banks and thus reduce the costs.  
The widespread use of audit committees and a quick glance at CG guidelines 
(MCCG, 2007 and 2012) highlights the importance placed on the role of 
appropriately constituted audit committee in monitoring the financial reporting 
process. Various regulatory committees reports (BRC, 1999; Committee, 1992) have 
recommended that a number of characteristics are important for an audit committee 
to perform its role competently and effectively. The combination of mechanisms can 
be considered better to reduce the agency problem and information asymmetry 
because a particular mechanism’s effectiveness depends on the effectiveness of 
others (Rediker and Seth, 1995). Audit committee characteristics, such as 
independence, financial expertise, size and meetings are a measurement of its 
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effectiveness (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Mangena and Pike, 2005). However, 
DeZoort et al. (2002) argue that the audit committee effectiveness framework could 
increase considerably if audit committee characteristics are studied together.  
This study suggests that an increase of the characteristics that enhance the 
board and audit committee effectiveness leads to a decrease of the level of 
information asymmetry and agency problem in capital market. Few studies have 
investigated the relationship between board of directors, audit committee 
characteristics and cost of debt by focusing on the impact of board independence, 
size, board ownership, audit committee size and independence (Adam et al., 2015; 
Anderson et al., 2004; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Ertugrul and Hegde, 2008; 
Paige Fields et al., 2012; Rahaman and Zaman, 2013; Tanaka, 2014).  
Most prior studies provided inconclusive or mixed results regarding the 
impact of CG and the cost of debt capital. Leaving the question of the impact of 
board and audit committee on cost of debt capital unanswered. Furthermore MCCG 
(2007 and 2012) consider the role of board of directors and audit committee to be a 
significant mechanism for governance which protects investors in capital market. 
Hence, this study aims to address this theoretical gap in the accounting literature and 
attempted to explore the relationship between board of directors characteristics 
namely size, independence, meeting, financial expertise and audit committee 
characteristics namely size, independence, meeting, financial expertise with the cost 
of debt by using sample of companies listed on the Malaysia capital markets. 
Prior studies on the cost of debt capital used governance indices to measure 
the effectiveness of the CG of company (Adam et al., 2015; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 
2006; Bin-Sariman et al., 2015; Chu et al., 2009; Paligorova and Yang, 2011; Zhu, 
2012). Bhagat et al. (2008) and Jiraporn and Chintrakarn (2009) claimed the 
governance indices have a serious weakness because some indices assign equal 
weights to all governance provisions included in the construction of the index. Some 
governance provisions may exacerbate managerial entrenchment, there is strong 
empirical evidence that staggered boards have more influence than any other 
governance provision (Jiraporn and Chintrakarn, 2009). Hence, this study aims to 
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address this gap in the accounting literature as it concentrates on the single CG 
characteristic, in order to capture the association between the board of directors and 
audit committees characteristic and cost of debt capital. 
The Malaysian capital market contains a unique corporate environment as its 
economy offers clearly identifiable capital segments divided along ethnic lines 
(Jesudason, 1989). After independence from the British in 1957, the government 
introduced the New Economic Policy (NEP) that gradually added Bumiputras to the 
Malaysian capital market (Jow et al., 2007). The presence of clearly recognizable 
ethnic domination of board membership and ownership of Malaysian listed 
companies provides evidence of monitoring differences that exist in these companies 
(Jow et al., 2007). Similarly, Chuah (1995) claimed that the minds of Malaysian 
managers are influenced by ethnicity, education, and the type of organizations they 
work for.  
In a study conducted by Archambault and Archambault (2003) companies in 
countries with a higher number of Muslim people had more transparent annual 
reports that reduced information asymmetry between companies and investors. 
According to Mohd Ghazali (2004) and Haniffa and Cooke (2002), there is a 
significant relationship between the number of directors in a board who are Malay 
and voluntary disclosure in annual reports. They found that Malaysian companies 
dominated by Malay directors have higher levels of voluntary disclosure, which is 
consistent with Islamic business ethics that encourage business transparency. Using 
the best practices of CG reduces information asymmetry and agency problems in 
capital market by encouraging high levels of transparency. A reduction of 
information asymmetry in capital market indirectly decreases the cost of raising fund 
from lenders. Prior studies have revealed that cultural characteristics such as 
ethnicity and education influences business processes, including disclosure, 
transparency, corporate social reporting, accounting conservatism, financial reporting 
quality, and earnings management, (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002; Hashim, 2012; Rahman and Ali, 2006; Stulz and Williamson, 2003; Tosi and 
Greckhamer, 2004; Yunos et al., 2012). Currently, there is lack of empirical evidence 
regarding the influence of the ethnicity and education of corporate board members on 
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the cost of debt capital. This is the first study that used ethnicity and education of 
corporate board for lowering agency problem in line of raising fund from lenders 
(debt). This study proposes that ethnicity and education of directors on the board 
enhance the transparency of company information, consequently leads to decrease of 
the level of information asymmetry and agency problem in capital market. Hence, 
this study addressed this theoretical gap by examining the effect of ethnicity and 
education of board and cost of debt capital as a bundle of board of director’s 
characteristic in protecting lenders’ interests in capital market.  
Audit quality of external auditors is another way to protect the lenders 
interest in capital market. The theoretical foundation of the relationship between 
audit quality and cost of debt capital in this study was provided by the signaling 
theory. Fundamental concern of signaling theory is the reduction information in 
capital market (Spence, 2002).  Signaling theory highlights the problems related to 
the information asymmetry in the markets. This theory presents how this information 
asymmetry can be lowered by the side with more information signaling to the other 
side (signaler and receiver). Hence, to decrease of information asymmetry in capital 
market, such external tools, known as audit quality of external auditors have been 
suggested. Recently, regulatory emphasis has been placed on the requirements for 
independent external auditors, the extent of the consultancy services, the non-audit 
services provided to audit customers, and use of the industry specialist auditors. The 
strong industry-specific knowledge offered by industry specialist auditor is expected 
to contribute to higher quality audits, more accurate financial information, and 
reduce information asymmetry in capital markets (Amir et al., 2010; Dhaliwal et al., 
2008; Li et al., 2010). Similarly, prior studies found that higher expensive audit fees 
were related to better monitoring (Elitzur and Falk, 1996; Hoitash et al., 2007).  
Most of the prior studies relating to audit quality and the cost of debt capital 
have concentrated on the size of the audit company, audit opinions, audit tenure, and 
Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors (Hwang et al., 2008; Karjalainen, 2011; Lai, 2011; Lou 
and Vasvari, 2009). Despite all the work done, substantial empirical evidence is still 
lacking and the many inconclusive and varying results leave the question of the 
association between audit quality proxies by (non-audit services, audit fees, and 
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industry specialist auditors) and the cost of debt capital still unanswered. Therefore, 
in terms of audit quality, the current literature only offers a partial concern of audit 
quality conducted by external auditors. Moreover, there is a lack in the studies of the 
potential effect of audit quality on the cost of debt capital. Hence, this study aims to 
address this theoretical gap in the accounting literature as it concentrated on the 
association between non-audit services, audit fees, and industry specialist auditors as 
proxies of audit quality and the cost of debt capital. 
1.4 Research Questions 
Based on the problem statements discussed above, the objective of this study 
was to answers to the research questions listed below: 
RQ1: Do board of directors characteristics (including: size, independence, 
financial expertise, meetings, ethnicity of directors and chairperson and education) 
affect the cost debt capital in Malaysian companies? 
RQ2: Do audit committees characteristics (including: size, independence, 
financial expertise and meetings) influence the cost debt capital in Malaysian 
companies? 
RQ3: Does audit quality proxies (including: audit fees, non-audit fees and 
industry specialist auditors) conducted by external auditors have significant effect on 
the cost of debt capital Malaysian companies? 
1.5 Research Objectives 
The objectives of this study were classified into three main objectives, which 
were derived from the research questions mentioned in the previous section: 
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RO1: To assess whether board of directors characteristics (including: size, 
independence, financial expertise, meetings, ethnicity of directors and chairperson 
and education) have a significant effect on the cost of debt capital. 
RO2: To investigate the effect of audit committee characteristics (including: 
size, independence, financial expertise and meetings) on the cost of debt capital. 
RO3: To examine whether audit quality proxies (including: audit fees, non-
audit fees and industry specialist auditors) conducted by external auditors have a 
significant influence on cost of debt capital. 
1.6 Significance and Contributions of the Study 
This study suggested that the cost of raising funds from lenders (debt) in 
capital market depends on CG monitoring mechanisms. CG monitoring mechanisms 
are related to internal CG mechanisms including board of directors, audit 
committees, and the quality of the audits conducted by external auditors as external 
mechanism. This study contributed to the existing body of knowledge by filling in 
gaps in the financial and accounting literature by evaluating the association between 
internal CG characteristics and audit quality proxies on the cost of debt capital. The 
empirical findings revealed that large boards with independent non-executive 
directors that met infrequently, the ethnicity of the directors on the board, and larger 
audit committees that met frequently, significantly reduced agency problems related 
to internal monitoring functions. These effective monitoring reduce the cost of 
raising fund from lenders (debt) in the capital market. The results also indicates that 
hiring industry specialist auditors and using the non-audit services of external 
auditors significantly reduced information asymmetry connected to external 
monitoring functions, which helped to lower the cost of debt capital in the capital 
market.  
 
14 
 
 
This study contributes to knowledge in several ways: 
First, this study contributed to the existing body of knowledge by responding 
to the lack of finance and accounting literature by assessing the association between 
audit quality using external auditor proxies such as audit fees, non-audit services, and 
industry specialist auditors, and the cost of debt capital. No previous studies have 
examined the relationship between audit quality using these external auditor’s 
proxies and the cost of debt capital in Malaysia context. Currently, more regulatory 
emphasis has been placed on the requirement for independent external auditors, the 
extent of the consultancy services they offer, the non-audit services provided to audit 
customers, and the use of the industry specialist auditors. The strong industry 
specific knowledge of the industry audit specialists contributes to a better quality 
audits, more accurate financial information, and better monitoring, all of which 
reduce information asymmetry (Amir et al., 2010; de Fuentes and Sierra, 2015; 
Dhaliwal et al., 2008; Fernando et al., 2010; Hajiha and Sobhani, 2012; Hope et al., 
2009; Li et al., 2010). Better monitoring by auditors allows investors to forgo their 
own costly monitoring actions used to reduce the risk of expropriation by managers. 
The investigation of Malaysia companies expanded existing knowledge by providing 
evidence from external CG practices, different institutional settings, and litigation 
each of which encourage quality in the audit market. This study’s findings 
contributed to signaling theory by providing evidence that higher audit quality is 
associated with lower cost of debt capital. 
Second, this study was a pioneer study, as there are no studies that examined 
the effect of the cultural characteristics, specifically the ethnicity and education, of 
board members in a multicultural country such as Malaysia on the cost of debt 
capital. Previous studies have emphasized the effect of ethnicity and business 
processes, including disclosure, transparency, corporate social reporting, accounting 
conservatism, financial reporting quality and earnings management (Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2005; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Hashim, 2012; Rahman and Ali, 2006; Stulz 
and Williamson, 2003; Tosi and Greckhamer, 2004; Yunos et al., 2012). The results 
of this study contribute to cultural theory by revealing the increase of transparency 
and disclosure of information directly in Malaysian companies. Consequently, the 
15 
 
 
results of this study can be used to decrease the cost of debt indirectly in the capital 
markets. The results of this study can also be used to improve information 
asymmetry in capital market, increase investment, and lower the cost of raising fund 
from lenders (debt) in capital market by increasing transparency and disclosure. 
Third, this study also contributed to the growing body of literature related to 
internal CG characteristics and cost of debt.  As stated earlier, prior research in these 
areas has focused on developed countries that have different legal and institutional 
environments and governance structures (Bradley and Chen, 2011; Gul et al., 2010; 
Hann et al., 2013; Huang and Wu, 2010; Paige Fields et al., 2012; Rahaman and 
Zaman, 2013; Upadhyay and Sriram, 2011). For example, some of these studies were 
conducted in the United States (Attig et al., 2012; Paligorova and Yang, 2011; Pham 
et al., 2012) and Australia. The results of these studies are limited and cannot be 
generalized to other countries. The results of this study contributed to agency theory 
by showing how increased internal monitoring by a board of directors and audit 
committees enhances shareholder confidence in the capital market by reducing 
agency problems. 
Fourth, many past studies related to CG and the cost of debt capital have 
concentrated on ownership structure, voting rights, shareholder rights, anti-takeover 
strategies, and institutional block holders (Farooq and Derrabi, 2012; Klock et al., 
2005; Pham et al., 2012; Piot and Missonier-Piera, 2007). Additionally, a review of 
the CG literature reveals that there are other important attributes that can affect the 
perception held by lenders of monitoring mechanisms and their role in reducing 
information asymmetry and agency problems in the capital markets. These attributes 
are representing in CG by the effectiveness of the board of directors and the audit 
committee. CG attributes that have an effect on reducing of the cost of raising  funds 
from lenders (debt) include internal monitoring by a board of directors (Fama, 1980; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983b), and audit committees (Pincus et al., 1990). 
Fifth, Malaysian CG codes have undergone a long process of amendments 
and enhancements to reach the current set of codes. The revisions made to the 
MCCG in 2007 and 2012 emphasized the responsibilities, functions, and role of the 
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board of directors, audit committee, and internal audit processes. Nevertheless, the 
effect of CG characteristics such as the board of directors and audit committee 
characteristics on the cost of debt capital has not been tested empirically in Malaysia. 
This study is a pioneer study that assessed the effect of internal CG mechanisms such 
as characteristic of an effective board of directors (size, independent, meeting, 
financial expertise) and audit committee (size, independent, meeting, financial 
expertise) on the debt in emerging capital market such as Malaysia. The findings 
from this study contribute to agency theory by supporting the growth of internal 
monitoring mechanisms that improve confidence in the capital markets.  
Sixth, this study also contributed to the practice as the findings of this study 
have implications for managers of companies and individuals as well as institutional 
investors, regulators, and corporate directors. This study demonstrated to managers 
who are in charge of investor relations and other parties the advantages and costs of 
the best practices of CG.  
Seventh, this present study contributed to methodology literature by 
considering and using synthetic rating estimation methods as a proxy of cost debt 
capital as an alternative to playing the role of a ratings agency and assigning a rating 
to a company based on its financial ratios (synthetic ratings). To overcome the lack 
of rating information for Malaysia agencies, this study used the synthetic rating 
estimation method proposed by Damodaran (2002) as a proxy of cost debt capital. 
Table 1.1 provides a summary of this study.   
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Table ‎1.1:  Summary of this Research 
Research Gap RQ 1 Findings Conclusion Contribution Implication 
-A lack of studies 
related to the 
relationship between 
board of director’s 
characteristics and the 
cost of debt capital due 
to the mixed and 
inconclusive results of 
previous studies.  
 
-No previous studies 
examined the effect of 
board of director’s 
characteristics on the 
cost of debt capital in 
Malaysian. 
 
-No previous studies 
examined the impact 
ethnicity and 
education of the 
directors on the board 
on cost of debt capital.  
 Do board of 
directors 
characteristics 
(including: size, 
independence, 
financial expertise, 
meetings, ethnicity 
of directors and 
chairperson and 
education) affect 
the cost debt 
capital in 
Malaysian 
companies?  
-Board size, independent 
non-executive directors, 
and the ethnicity of Malay 
directors have a 
significant negative effect 
on the cost of debt capital.  
 
-Board meetings had a 
positive and significant 
effect on the cost of debt 
capital.  
 
 
 
The results indicate 
that characteristics of 
the board of directors 
have a significant 
ability to decrease 
agency problems, 
which helps lower the 
cost of raising fund 
from lenders in the 
capital market. 
Theoretical 
-This study contributed to agency 
theory by concentrating on 
monitoring the role of the best 
practices of internal CG (such as 
board of director’s effectiveness) 
within companies to reduce the 
components of cost for raising fund 
in capital market. 
-This study contributed to cultural 
theory by concentrating on linking 
the ethnicity of the Malay directors 
who sit on the board of directors with 
line a decrease in the cost of raising 
fund from lenders (debt) in capital 
market. 
 
Practical 
The findings of this study have 
implications for managers of 
companies, individuals, institutional 
investors, regulators, and corporate 
directors. 
Methodological 
A methodological approach for 
measuring the cost of debt based on 
the synthetic rating estimation 
method was developed in this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
-Implications for corporations 
that need to satisfy lenders 
and attract potential investors 
include the ability of measure 
the impact of monitoring 
systems such as CG so that 
decision makers can evaluate 
the role of these monitoring 
systems in enhancing lenders 
perception of the quality of 
financial information.  
 
-This study added to the 
understanding of agency 
theory in a developing 
country where companies are 
monitored by internal CG 
mechanisms (board of 
directors effectiveness), in 
which the agency 
relationships are complex. 
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Research Gap RQ 2 Findings Conclusion Contribution Implication 
.-A lack of studies 
related to the 
relationship between 
audit committee 
characteristics and the 
cost of debt capital due 
to the inconclusive 
results of previous 
studies.  
 
-No previous studies 
examined the effect of 
audit committee 
characteristics on the 
cost of debt capital in 
Malaysian. 
 
Do audit 
committee 
characteristics 
(including: size, 
independence, 
financial expertise 
and meetings) 
influence the cost 
debt capital in 
Malaysian 
companies? 
 
-The size of the audit 
committee had a 
significant negative effect 
on the cost of debt capital. 
 
-Audit committee 
meetings had a significant 
negative effect on the cost 
of debt capital. 
 
The results indicate that 
characteristics of the 
audit committee have a 
remarkable ability to 
reduce information 
asymmetry and agency 
problems, which helps 
lower the cost of raising 
fund from lenders in the 
capital market. 
Theoretical 
 
-This study contributed to agency theory 
by concentrating on monitoring the role of 
the best practices of internal CG (such as 
audit committee effectiveness) within 
companies to reduce the agency problem. 
 
Practical 
 
The findings of this study have 
implications for internal auditor and audit 
committee of companies and regulators. 
 
Methodological 
 
A methodological approach for measuring 
the cost of debt based on the synthetic 
rating estimation method was developed in 
this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Creditors and 
shareholders benefit 
from the findings of 
this study because they 
will have a better 
understanding of how 
internal CG 
characteristics such as 
(audit committee 
effectiveness) affect the 
cost of debt capital. 
 
-The CG authorities, 
especially in Malaysia, 
can use this study as 
empirical support for 
developing their 
regulations and making 
further 
recommendations.  
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Research Gap RQ 3 Findings Conclusion Contribution Implication 
-There is a need 
to investigate the 
effect of audit 
quality proxies 
(audit fees, non-
audit fees and 
industry specialist 
auditors) on the 
cost of debt 
capital due to a 
lack of studies 
and the mixed 
results of the 
previous studies 
that do exist.  
 
-There are no 
prior studies 
conducted in 
Malaysia context. 
 
 
Does audit quality 
proxies 
(including: audit 
fees, non-audit 
fees and industry 
specialist 
auditors) 
conducted by 
external auditors 
have significant 
effect on the cost 
of debt capital 
Malaysian 
companies? 
Non-audit services 
fees have a 
significant and 
negative effect on the 
cost of debt capital. 
 
-Using auditors who 
specialize in an 
industry has a 
significant and 
negative effect on the 
cost of debt capital. 
 
The results show 
that using the 
non-audit services 
provided by 
external auditors 
and hiring 
auditors who 
specialize in an 
industry has a 
remarkable 
influence on 
reducing 
information 
asymmetry, which 
lowers the cost of 
raising funds from 
lenders in the 
capital market. 
Theoretical 
-This study contributed to signaling theory by 
focusing on the external monitoring role of 
audit quality as a way to reduce the cost of 
raising funds from lenders in the capital 
market. 
-The prevalent doubts expressed in the 
literature regarding how proxies for audit 
quality decrease the of cost debt was 
supported.  
 
Practical 
The findings from this study have 
implications for managers of companies, 
internal and external auditors, and regulators.  
 
Methodological 
-A methodological approach for measuring the 
cost of debt capital based on the synthetic 
rating estimation method was developed in 
this study. 
 
-This study has added to 
the understanding of 
signaling theory in 
developing countries, 
where companies are 
monitored by external CG 
mechanisms such as the 
quality of the audits 
conducted by external 
auditors with complex 
information asymmetry in 
the capital market. 
-Stock market authorities 
can employ this study’s 
results to evaluate the role 
of the quality of an audit 
conducted by an external 
auditor to improve the 
quality of information and 
accounting reports in 
capital markets.  
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1.7 Scope of the Study 
In line with the research objectives, this study was carried out using 
companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia from various industries (construction, 
industrial products, plantations, properties, consumer products, hotels, REITS, 
infrastructure, tin, mining, technology, trade, and services) from 2003 to 2012. This 
study empirically assess the relationship between the internal CG mechanisms 
characteristics of an effective board of directors and audit committee, the quality of 
audits conducted by external auditors as external CG mechanisms proxies (non-audit 
services, audit fees and industry specialized auditor) on the cost of debt capital. 
Related objectives were examined using the three main research questions. Each of 
the research questions were deconstructed into testable hypotheses. The Table 1.2 
present’s summary of hypotheses developed and the underlying theories. 
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Table ‎1.2:  Summary of Hypotheses and the Underlying Theories 
Objectives Hypothesis Theory 
1 
H1: Larger boards of directors are associated with lower 
cost of debt capital. 
 
Agency 
theory 
H2: Larger proportion of independent boards of 
directors is associated with lower cost of debt capital. 
 
Agency 
theory 
H3: Financial expertise director on the board is 
associated with lower cost of debt capital. 
 
Agency 
theory 
H4: There is a relationship between the board’s meeting 
frequency and cost of debt capital. 
 
Agency 
theory 
H5: There is a relationship between ethnicity of director 
on the board and cost of debt capital.  
Cultural 
Theory 
H6: There is a relationship between ethnicity of 
chairperson on the board and cost of debt capital.  
Cultural 
Theory 
H7: There is a relationship between qualification of 
director on the board and cost of debt capital. 
 
Cultural 
Theory 
2 
H8: Larger audit committees are associated with lower 
cost of debt capital. 
 
Agency 
theory 
H9: Larger proportion of independent audit committees 
is associated with lower cost of debt capital. 
 
Agency 
theory 
H10: There is a negative relationship between the audit 
committee’s financial expertise and cost of debt capital. 
 
Agency 
theory 
H11: There is a relationship between the audit 
committee’s meeting frequency and cost of debt capital. 
 
Agency 
theory 
3 
H12: There is a positive relationship between audit fees 
and cost of debt capital.  
Signaling 
Theory 
H13: There is a negative relationship between Non- audit 
service fees and cost of debt capital.  
Signaling 
Theory 
H14: There is a negative relationship between industry 
specialist auditor and cost of debt capital.  
Signaling 
Theory 
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1.8 Methodology  
In addressing the concerns enumerated in the study objectives the researcher 
adopts a positivist epistemological construct and uses a deductive research approach 
and quantitative research strategy relying on secondary data. Specifically, the annual 
reports of companies, both in hard copy and on-line versions, as well as, information 
from DataStream, a Blomberg database were used extensively. The data collected 
were prepared (which involved classification, rearrangement, and transformation) to 
make them ready for statistical and econometric processing. The statistical software 
STATA version 13 is utilized for data analysis. The data analysis involves techniques 
such as the descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, multivariate regression 
(ordinary least square (OLS) regression model), assumption for multiple regressions 
analyses and robustness analysis. 
1.9 Limitation of the Study  
The main objective of the thesis was to contribute to the debate on the 
relationship between; internal and external CG characteristics, especially the board of 
director and audit committee characteristics, audit quality of external auditors and 
their effect on cost of debt capital. Some of the study limitations are discussed below: 
The sample companies cover most industries but financial institutions were 
not included in the sampling framework of this study because of their different 
capital structure, regulations, profits (Ali Shah and Butt, 2009; Pham et al., 2012; 
Ramly, 2012) and materially different types of operations (Mohd Ghazali and 
Weetman, 2006). The exclusion of financial institutions limited the generalizability 
of the results across all industrial sectors. This limitation should be researched in 
future studies as the sample companies used in this study do not reflective of all 
companies, especially companies in the financial sector. 
Some external audit quality variables such as non-audit fees, audit fees and 
the use of an industry specialist auditor are subject to debate about whether they 
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indicate auditor independence and audit quality. In this thesis, the audit quality 
measures were driven by the auditor’s reputation and perceived auditor 
independence. Thus, the results were based on market perceptions (audit quality as 
perceived by market participants).The use of other audit quality measures such as 
restatements and auditor litigation may help to generalize the actual audit quality 
rather than the perceived audit quality. 
This study estimated the cost of debt capital using two methods: the synthetic 
rating estimation and average interest rate method. Although there are other methods 
for estimating the cost of debt capital, such as the yield spread and yield to maturity 
method recommended by (Anderson et al., 2004; Duffee, 1998; Ertugrul and Hegde, 
2008; Klock et al., 2005). This study did not use either of those two due to their lack 
of information regarding the capital market for companies listed on the Bursa 
Malaysia. The limitations of study should be researched in future studies as 
additional methods for estimating the cost of debt capital may help generalize better 
results.  
1.10 Thesis Outline  
This study is organized into five chapters. The first chapter presents the 
research background and problem statements. In addition to, the research questions, 
research objectives, significance and contributions made by the study along with a 
short description of the scope of the study, methodology, limitation of study and 
terminology used are also covered.  
Chapter two provides a general understanding of the nature of CG in general, 
and overview of Malaysian CG, and the development of the CG code. It discusses 
the demand for auditing services and quality audits, the monitoring role of the board 
of directors, audit committees, and external auditors. It also provides a general 
understanding of the cost of debt capital. It highlights theoretical frameworks, such 
as agency theory, signaling theory, and cultural theory. It provides a review of past 
studies conducted regarding CG characteristics, audit quality, and the cost of debt 
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capital. The chapter ends with the research framework and the development of the 
hypotheses based on previous studies.  
Chapter three provides the methodological framework utilized in this study. It 
elaborates and justifies the selection process used to generate samples, the duration 
of the study, sources of data, and data collection methods. The methods used to 
measure the independent and dependent variables, control variables, and model 
specifications are provided. The analysis process, a summary of methods used for 
testing the hypotheses, and measurement of variables are revealed. 
Chapter four reports the results of the empirical findings related to CG, audit 
quality, and the cost of debt capital based on the objectives of study. It begins with 
descriptive statistics and correlation analysis, which is then followed by presenting 
the results of the tested models and the inferences occurring from the hypothesis 
testing. The outcome of the empirical findings regarding the relationships between 
CG characteristics and audit quality proxies on the cost of debt capital is presented. 
The results of additional analyses are also given to confirm the robustness of the 
initial regression analyses. 
Chapter five includes a summary and discussion of the findings of the study 
and how it relates to prior research findings and related theories. This is followed by 
a description of the limitations of the study and possible avenues for further research 
before a final conclusion is presented.  
1.11 Terminology  
Particular terms were used in this study and they are defined as follows: 
 Corporate Governance (CG): The Cadbury Committee Report (1992) point 
out that CG is an arrangement through which organizations are controlled and 
directed. It identifies the functions of key people in a company who are 
represented by a board of directors, the auditors, and the shareholders. 
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 Board of directors: Fama and Jensen (1983b) defined the board of directors as 
those who ratify management decisions, monitor performance, manage 
decisions and decision control functions. The board of directors is statutorily 
appointed by the shareholders to represent and protect their interests and they 
represent the highest decision making body of a company. 
 Audit committee: The audit committee is defined as a subcommittee of board 
of directors that is comprised mostly of non- executive or independent 
directors who are responsible for overseeing auditing activities (Abernathy et 
al., 2011; Birkett, 1986; Collier, 1993). 
 Audit Quality: The quality of audit services is defined as the market-assessed 
joint probability that a given auditor will both (a) discover a breach in the 
client’s accounting system and (b) report that breach (DeAngelo, 1981b). 
 Information asymmetry: Information asymmetry is the information gap 
between mangers and investors. When information asymmetry between 
managers and investors increases, investors increase the cost of raising fund 
because of the associated risk  (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991).  
 Cost of Debt: The minimum expected return that providers of debt financial   
require before they will lend to companies. The cost of obtaining and using 
interest-paying liabilities is known as the cost of debt. Generally, companies 
incur debt through the issuance of debentures and bonds. Thus, the cost of 
debt is the cost associated with interest payments and other costs connected to 
issuing debentures and bonds  (Pratt and Grabowski, 2008).  
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fees and engaging industry specialist auditor incurred lower cost of debt capital. This 
suggested that that a higher quality audits reduced information asymmetries in 
capital markets and consequently lower debt financing. The results of using industry 
specialist auditors and the cost of debt capital demonstrated that there was a 
significant negative relationship between engaging industry specialist auditors and 
the cost of debt capital. Based on signaling theory, the research result provided 
empirical evidence that lenders and investors can use to evaluate the benefits of 
auditor specialization for reducing information asymmetry in capital markets and 
consequently increase the quality of an audit.  
The findings of the study revealed that companies audited by auditor who 
specialize in an industry provide higher audit quality. This suggests that debt 
investors charge lower rates for debt capital because of the perceived lower risks for 
these companies. There was a significant relationship between the use of auditors 
who specialize in an industry and the cost of debt in Malaysia context. The results 
regarding the effect of non-audit services on the cost of debt capital suggested that 
there is a significant and negative relationship between the costs of debt capital when 
higher non-audit service fees were incurred. The results were robust under various 
tests of robustness and sensitivity. There was no evidence to suggest that there was a 
relationship between audit fees and the cost of debt capital in Malaysia.  
Overall, the present study concludes that agency problems can be reduced by 
encouraging internal CG characteristics that are associated with effective boards of 
directors and audit committees that supports their internal monitoring functions. This 
study also concludes that lowering the cost of capital may increase the demand for 
higher audit quality, because higher audit quality is expected to reduce information 
asymmetry and consequently lowering the cost of debt capital.   
  
231 
 REFERENCES  
Abbott, L. J., Park, Y., and Parker, S. (2000). The Effects of Audit Committee 
Activity and Independence on Corporate Fraud. Managerial Finance. 26(11), 
55-68. 
Abbott, L. J., Parker, S., and Peters, G. F. (2004). Audit Committee Characteristics 
and Restatements. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory. 23(1), 69-87. 
Abbott, L. J., Parker, S., Peters, G. F., and Raghunandan, K. (2003). An Empirical 
Investigation of Audit Fees, Nonaudit Fees, and Audit Committees. 
Contemporary Accounting Research. 20(2), 215-234. 
Abdellatif, A. E. M. (2009). Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Asymmetric 
Information: An Application on the U.K. Capital Market. PhD Thesis. 
University of Surrey, UK. 
Abdulhafedh, K. (2006). Testing and Evaluation of the Relationship Between the 
Cost of Capital and Stock Market Returns: An Empirical Study on the 
Industrial Companies Listed on the Amman Financial Market. Working 
paper, University of the Western Mountain Libya  
Abdullah, S. N. (2006). Board Structure and Ownership in Malaysia: the Case of 
Distressed Listed Companies. Corporate Governance. 6(5), 582-594. 
Abernathy, J., Kang, T., and Krishnan, G. (2011). Audit Committee Expertise and 
Financial Analysts’ and Investors’ Ability to Anticipate Future Earnings. 
Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1942928. 
Abu Bakar, N. B., and Ahmad, M. (2009). Auditor Independence: Malaysian 
Accountants’ Perception. International Journal of Business and 
Management. 4(12), 129-141. 
  
232 
Adam, M., Soraya, N., and Yusrianti, H. (2015). Good Corporate Governance and 
Cost of Debt: Listed Companies on Indonesian Institute for Corporate 
Governance. Asian Social Science. 11(25), 58. 
Adams, R. B., and Mehran, H. (2005). Corporate Performance, Board Structure and 
Its Determinants in the Banking Industry. Available at  
http://papers.ssrn.com/Sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=302593. 
Adelopo, I., and Jallow, K. (2008). Board Structures, Audit Committee 
Characteristics, and External Auditors’ Fee Behaviour. 2nd European Risk 
Conference, University of Bocconi, Milan. 
Adkins, L. C. (2007). Using Stata for Principles of Econometrics, Third edition. New 
York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Agrawal, A., and Chadha, S. (2005). Corporate Governance and Accounting 
Scandals. Journal of Law and Economics. 48(2), 371-406. 
Ahmed, A., Rasmussen, S., and Tse, S. (2008). Audit Quality, Alternative 
Monitoring Mechanisms, and Cost of Capital: An Empirical Analysis 
Working Paper, Texas A&M University, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1124082. 
Ahmed, K., and Nicholls, D. (1994). The Impact of Non-Financial Company 
Characteristics on Mandatory Disclosure Compliance in Developing 
Countries: The case of Bangladesh. The International Journal of Accounting 
29(1), 62 – 77. 
Akhtaruddin, M., and Haron, H. (2010). Board Ownership, Audit committees' 
Effectiveness and Corporate Voluntary Disclosures. Asian Review of 
Accounting. 18(1), 68-82. 
Al-Mamun, A., Yasser, Q. R., Rahman, M. A., Wickramasinghe, A., and Nathan, T. 
M. (2014). Relationship between Audit Committee Characteristics, External 
Auditors and Economic Value Added (EVA) of Public Listed Firms in 
Malaysia. Corporate Ownership & Control      12(1), 899-910. 
Al-Matari, Y. A., Al-Swidi, A. K., Fadzil, F. H. B. F. H., and Al-Matari, E. M. 
(2012). Board of Directors, Audit Committee Characteristics and the 
  
233 
Performance of Saudi Arabia Listed Companies. International Review of 
Management and Marketing. 2(4), 241-251. 
Aldamen, H., Duncan, K., and McNamara, R. (2010). Corporate Governance, Rsk 
Assessment and Cost of Debt. AFAANZ conference, Christchurch, New 
Zealand. 
Alhabshi, O. (1994). The Role and Influence of Religion in Society. Institute of 
Islamic Understanding Malaysia. 
Ali Shah, S., and Butt, S. (2009). The Impact of Corporate Governance on the Cost 
of Equity: Empirical Evidence from Pakistani Listed Companies. The Lahore 
Journal of Economics. 14(1), 139-171. 
Amir, E., Guan, Y., and Livne, G. (2010). Auditor Independence and the Cost of 
Capital Before and After Sarbanes–Oxley: The Case of Newly Issued Public 
Debt. European Accounting Review. 19(4), 633-664. 
Anderson, R. C., Mansi, S. A., and Reeb, D. M. (2003). Founding Family Ownership 
and the Agency Cost of Debt. Journal of Financial Economics. 68(2), 263-
285. 
Anderson, R. C., Mansi, S. A., and Reeb, D. M. (2004). Board Characteristics, 
Accounting Report Integrity, and the Cost of Debt. Journal of Accounting 
and Economics. 37(3), 315-342. 
Anderson, R. C., and Reeb, D. M. (2004). Board Composition: Balancing Family 
Influence in S&P 500 Firms. Administrative Science Quarterly. 49(2), 209-
237. 
Archambault, J. J., and Archambault, M. E. (2003). A multinational test of 
determinants of corporate disclosure. The International Journal of 
Accounting. 38(2), 173-194. 
Archambeault, D., and DeZoort, F. T. (2001). Auditor Opinion Shopping and the 
Audit Committee: An Analysis of Suspicious Auditor Switches. International 
Journal of Auditing. 5(1), 33-52. 
Arruñada, B. (2004). Audit Failure and the Crisis of Auditing. European Business 
Organization Law Review. 5(4), 635-643. 
  
234 
Asare, S., Cohen, J., and Trompeter, G. (2005). The Effect of Non-Audit Services on 
Client Risk, Acceptance and Staffing Decisions. Journal of Accounting and 
Public Policy. 24(6), 489-520. 
Ashbaugh-Skaife, H., Collins, D. W., and LaFond, R. (2006). The Effects of 
Corporate Governance on Firms’ Credit Ratings. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics. 42(1), 203-243. 
Ashbaugh-Skaife, H., and LaFond, R. (2006). Firms' Corporate Governance and the 
Cost of Debt: An Analysis of US Firms' GMI Ratings. Working Paper, 
University of Wisconsin, Madison. 
Ashbaugh, H., Collins, D. W., and LaFond, R. (2004). Corporate Governance and the 
Cost of Equity Capital. Working paper, University of Wisconsin, and 
University of Iowa. 
Ashbaugh, H., LaFond, R., and Mayhew, B. W. (2003). Do Nonaudit Services 
Compromise Auditor Independence? Further Evidence. The Accounting 
Review. 78(3), 611-639. 
Aswadi Abdul Wahab, E., Mat Zain, M., James, K., and Haron, H. (2009). 
Institutional Investors, Political Connection and Audit Quality in Malaysia. 
Accounting Research Journal. 22(2), 167-195. 
Attig, N., Cleary, S., El Ghoul, S., and Guedhami, O. (2012). Institutional Investment 
Horizons and the Cost of Equity Capital. Financial Management. 42(2), 441–
477. 
Bai, C.-E., Liu, Q., Lu, J., Song, F. M., and Zhang, J. (2004). Corporate Governance 
and Market Valuation in China. Journal of Comparative Economics. 32(4), 
599-616. 
Bai, J., and Ng, S. (2005). Tests for Skewness, Kurtosis, and Normality for Time 
Series Data. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics. 23(1), 49-60. 
Bailey, A. D., and Grambling, A. A. (2005). Financial Reporting Quality. Research 
on Professional Responsibility and Ethics in Accounting. 10, 3-34. 
Bainbridge, S. M. (1993). Insider Trading Under the Restatement of the Law 
Governing Lawyers. Journal of Corporate Law. 19(1), 1-41. 
  
235 
Barton, S. L., and Gordon, P. J. (1988). Corporate Strategy and Capital Structure. 
Strategic Management Journal. 9(6), 623-632. 
Basiruddin, R., Benyasrisawat, P., and Rasid, S. Z. A. (2014). Audit Quality and 
Cost of Equity Capital. Afro-Asian Journal of Finance and Accounting. 4(2), 
95-111. 
Basiruddin, R., Benyasrisawat, P., and Rasid, S. Z. A. (2014 ). Audit quality and cost 
of equity capital. Afro-Asian J. of Finance and Accounting. 4(2), 95 - 111. 
Baxter, P. J. (2007). Audit Committees and Financial Reporting Quality. PhD Thesis. 
University of Southern Queensland, Australia. 
Baysinger, B., and Hoskisson, R. E. (1990). The Composition of Boards of Directors 
and Strategic Control: Effects on Corporate Strategy. Academy of 
Management Review. 15(1), 72-87. 
Beale, C. M., Lennon, J. J., Elston, D. A., Brewer, M. J., and Yearsley, J. M. (2007). 
Red Herrings Remain in Geographical Ecology: A Reply to Hawkins et al. 
(2007). Ecography. 30(6), 845-847. 
Beasley, M. S. (1996). An Empirical Analysis of the Relation Between the Board of 
Director Composition and Financial Statement Fraud. Accounting Review. 
71(4), 443-465. 
Beasley, M. S., Carcello, J. V., Hermanson, D. R., and Lapides, P. D. (2000). 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting: Consideration of Industry Traits and 
Corporate Governance Mechanisms. Accounting Horizons. 14(4), 441-454. 
Beattie, V., and Fearnley, S. (2002). Auditor Independence and Non-Audit Services: 
A Literature Review. Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and 
Wales, London. 
Beattie, V. A., and Fearnley, S. (1998). What Companies Want (and Don't Want) 
from Their Auditors: Research Briefing. Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England and Wales. 
Beck, P. J., and Wu, M. G. (2006). Learning by Doing and Audit Quality. 
Contemporary Accounting Research. 23(1), 1-30. 
  
236 
Bedard, J., Chtourou, S. M., and Courteau, L. (2004). The Effect of Audit Committee 
Expertise, Independence, and Activity on Aggressive Earnings Management. 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory. 23(2), 13-35. 
Bedard, J. C., and Biggs, S. F. (1991). The Effect of Domain-Specific Experience on 
Evaluation of Management Representations in Analytical Procedures. 
Auditing-a Journal of Practice & Theory. 10, 77-95. 
Beekes, W., and Brown, P. (2006). Do Better Governed Australian Firms Make 
More Informative Disclosures? Journal of Business Finance & Accounting. 
33(3‐4), 422-450. 
Beeler, J. D., and Hunton, J. E. (2002). Contingent Economic Rents: Insidious 
Threats to Audit Independence. Advances in Accounting Behavioral 
Research. 5, 21-50. 
Belkaoui, A. (1980). The Interprofessional Linguistic Communication of Accounting 
Concepts: an Experiment in Sociolinguistics. Journal of Accounting 
Research. 18(2), 362-374. 
Ben-Nasr, H., Ghouma, H., and Alami, E.-M. (2014). Auditor Choice and Corporate 
Bond Ratings: International Evidence. International Journal of Economics 
and Finance. 6(1), 183-193. 
Benkraiem, R. (2009). Does the Presence of Independent Directors Influence 
Accruals Management? Journal of Applied Business Research 25(6), 77-86. 
Bentz, V. M., and Shapiro, J. J. (1998). Mindful Inquiry in Social Research. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications. 
Bernal, A., and Lubrano. (2007). Growth, Financing, and Corporate Governance. 
Working Paper,International Finance Corporation World Bank Group. 
Bhagat, S., Bolton, B., and Romano, R. (2008). The Promise and Peril of Corporate 
Governance Indices. Columbia Law Review. 108(8), 1803-1882. 
Bhattacharya, U., and Daouk, H. (2002). The World Price of Insider Trading. The 
Journal of Finance. 57(1), 75-108. 
  
237 
Bhojraj, S., and Sengupta, P. (2003). Effect of Corporate Governance on Bond 
Ratings and Yields: The Role of Institutional Investors and Outside Directors. 
The Journal of Business. 76(3), 455-475. 
Bhuiyan, M. B. U., Roudaki, J., and Clark, M. B. (2010). Characteristics of the 
Board of Directors and Company Performance: New Zealand Evidence. 
Journal of Accounting, Business and Management. 17(2), 49-61. 
Biggins, J. V. (1999). Making Board Diversity Work. Corporate Board. 20(117), 11-
17. 
Bin-Sariman, A. S., Ali, A., and Nor, M. N. M. (2015). Board of Directors’ Quality 
and Firms’ Debt Financing: the Moderating Effect of Insider Ownership–
Evidence from Omani Firms. Applied Economics, 1-9. 
Birkett, B. S. (1986). The Recent History of Corporate Audit Committees. The 
Accounting Historians Journal, 109-124. 
Birnberg, J. G., and Snodgrass, C. (1988). Culture and Control: A Feld Study. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society. 13(5), 447-464. 
Bliss, M. A., and Gul, F. A. (2012). Political Connection and Cost of Debt: Some 
Malaysian Evidence. Journal of Banking & Finance. 36(5), 1520–1527. 
Blom, J., and Schauten, M. B. (2006). Corporate Governance and the Cost of Debt. 
Working Paper. Erasmus University Rotterdam and ABN-Amro Bank. 
Blom, J., and Schauten, M. B. (2008). Corporate Governance and the Cost of Debt. 
New Developments in Financial Modelling. 1(1), 116-145. 
Bloomfield, R. (2008). Discussion of “Annual Report Readability, Current Earnings, 
and Earnings Persistence”. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 45(2-3), 
248-252. 
Boone, J., Khurana, I., and Raman, K. (2005). Audit Firm Tenure and the Equity 
Premium in US and Italy. Working Paper, University of Texas at San 
Antonio, University of Missouri–Columbia, and University of North Texas. 
Borisova, G., and Megginson, W. L. (2011). Does Government Ownership Affect the 
Cost of Debt? Evidence from Privatization. Review of Financial Studies. 
24(8), 2693-2737. 
  
238 
Bouwman, M. J., Frishkoff, P. A., and Frishkoff, P. (1987). How Do Financial 
Analysts Make Decisions? A Process Model of the Investment Screening 
Decision. Accounting, Organizations and Society. 12(1), 1-29. 
Bozec, R. (2005). Boards of Directors, Market Discipline and Firm Performance. 
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting. 32(9‐10), 1921-1960. 
Bozec, Y., and Bozec, R. (2010). Overall Governance and Cost of Capital: Evidence 
From Canada Using Panel Data. Journal of Global Business Management. 
6(1), 1-11. 
Bradbury, M., Mak, Y. T., and Tan, S. (2006). Board Characteristics, Audit 
committee Characteristics and Abnormal Accruals. Pacific Accounting 
Review. 18(2), 47-68. 
Bradford, W., and Zhao, C. C. B. Z. Y. (2015). The Effect of Corporate Governance 
on Credit Ratings: Evidence from China’s Bond Market. The Second Annual 
Credit Risk Conference, Recent Advances in Credit  Research, May 16, 2015. 
Shanghai, China. 
Bradley, M., and Chen, D. (2010). Corporate Governance, Credit Condition, and the 
Cost of Debt. Working Paper. Duke University. 
Bradley, M., and Chen, D. (2011). Corporate Governance and the Cost of Debt: 
Evidence from Director Limited Liability and Indemnification Provisions. 
Journal of Corporate Finance. 17(1), 83-107. 
Bradley, M., and Chen, D. (2015). Does Board Independence Reduce the Cost of 
Debt? Financial Management. 44(1), 15-47. 
Braiotta Jr, L. (1986). Audit Committees: an International Survey. The Corporate 
Board. 7(3), 18-23. 
Brandon, D. M., Crabtree, A. D., and Maher, J. J. (2004). Nonaudit Fees, Auditor 
Independence, and Bond Ratings. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory. 
23(2), 89-103. 
BRC. (1999). Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on 
Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees. New 
York,Washington, DC, NYSE and NASD. 
  
239 
Brealey, R., and Myers, S. C. (2000). Principles of Corporate Finance 6 ed. 
McGraw-Hill. 
Brealey, R., and Myers, S. C. (2003). Principles of Corporate Finance 7ed. 
McGraw-Hill. 
Brennan, N., and McDermott, M. (2004). Alternative Perspectives on Independence 
of Directors. Corporate Governance: An International Review. 12(3), 325-
336. 
Breusch, T. S., and Pagan, A. R. (1979). A Simple Test for Heteroscedasticity and 
Random Coefficient Variation. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric 
Society. 45(5), 1287-1294. 
Bronson, S. N., Carcello, J. V., Hollingsworth, C. W., and Neal, T. L. (2009). Are 
Fully Independent Audit Committees Really Necessary? Journal of 
Accounting and Public Policy. 28(4), 265-280. 
Brown, W. A. (2007). Board Development Practices and Competent Board 
Members: Implications for Performance. Nonprofit Management and 
Leadership. 17(3), 301-317. 
Bryman, A., and Bell, E. (2003). Business Research Methods. Oxford University 
Press. 
Burak Güner, A., Malmendier, U., and Tate, G. (2008). Financial Expertise of 
Directors. Journal of Financial Economics. 88(2), 323-354. 
Bursey, A., and Pittman, J. (2010). The Impact of Financial Expertise. CMA 
Management. 85(5), 8-21. 
Byun, H.-Y. (2007). The Cost of Debt Capital and Corporate Governance Practices. 
Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies. 36(5), 765-806. 
Cadbury. (1992). Report of the committee on the financial aspects of corporate 
governance. 
Cai, C. X., Keasey, K., and Short, H. (2006). Corporate Governance and Information 
Efficiency in Security Markets. European Financial Management. 12(5), 
763-787. 
  
240 
Cantor, P. (2005). Board Performance: A Three—Legged Stool. Ivey Business 
Journal 70(2), 1-5. 
Carcello, J. V., Hermanson, D. R., Neal, T. L., and Riley, R. A. (2002). Board 
Characteristics and Audit Fees. Contemporary Accounting Research. 19(3), 
365-384. 
Carcello, J. V., and Neal, T. L. (2003). Audit Committee Characteristics and Auditor 
Dismissals Following “New” Going-Concern Reports. The Accounting 
Review. 78(1), 95-117. 
Carey, M., Prowse, S., Rea, J., and Udell, G. (1993). The Economics of Private 
Placements: a New Look. Financial Markets Institutions and Instruments(2), 
1-66. 
Causholli, M., and Knechel, W. R. (2012). Lending Relationships, Auditor Quality 
and Debt Costs. Managerial Auditing Journal. 27(6), 550-572. 
Chadegani, A. (2011). Review of studies on audit quality. International Conference 
on Humanities, Society and Culture IPEDR. Singapore. 
Chandrasegaram, R., Rahimansa, M. R., Rahman, S. K., Abdullah, S., and Mat, N. 
N. (2013). Impact of Audit Committee Characteristics on Earnings 
Management in Malaysian Public Listed Companies. International Journal of 
Finance and Accounting. 2(2), 114-119. 
Chen, A. H. (1978). Recent Developments in the Cost of Debt Capital. The Journal 
of Finance. 33(3), 863-877. 
Chen, D. (2014). The Non-Monotonic Effect of Board Independence on Credit 
Ratings. Journal of Financial Services Research. 45(2), 145-171. 
Chen, P. F., He, S., Ma, Z., and Stice, D. (2015). The Information Role of Audit 
Opinions in Debt Contracting. Available at 
:http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2599886. 
Chen, X., Ender, P., Mitchell, M., and Wells, C. (2003). Regression with STATA. 
Available at http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/webbooks/reg/.  
  
241 
Cheng, C. S. A., Collins, D., and Huang, H. H. (2006). Shareholder Rights, Financial 
Disclosure and the Cost of Equity Capital. Review of Quantitative Finance 
and Accounting. 27(2), 175-204. 
Cheng, S. (2008). Board Size and the Variability of Corporate Performance. Journal 
of Financial Economics. 87(1), 157-176. 
Chien, S.-H., and Chen, Y.-S. (2005). The Provision of Non-Audit Services by 
Accounting Firms After the Enron Bankruptcy in the United States. 
International Journal of Management. 22(2), 300-306. 
Choi, J. J., Park, S. W., and Yoo, S. S. (2007). The Value of Outside Directors: 
Evidence from Corporate Governance Reform in Korea. Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis. 42(4), 941-962. 
Choi, S. U., and Lee, W. J. (2015). The Effect Of IFRS Non-Audit Consulting 
Services On Cost Of Debt: Evidence From Korea. Journal of Applied 
Business Research 31(5), 1889-1898. 
Chu, L., Mathieu, R., and Mbagwu, C. (2009). The Impact of Corporate Governance 
and Audit Quality on the Cost of Private Loans. Accounting Perspectives. 
8(4), 277-304. 
Chuah, B. (1995). The Unique Breed of Malaysian Managers. Management Times, 
New Straits Times Press Malaysia, 6-20. 
Chuluun, T., Prevost, A., and Puthenpurackal, J. (2014). Board Ties and the Cost of 
Corporate Debt. Financial Management. 43(3), 533-568. 
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., and Lang, L. H. (2000). The Separation of Ownership 
and Control in East Asian Corporations. Journal of Financial Economics. 
58(1), 81-112. 
Clark, G. L., and Wójcik, D. (2005). Financial Valuation of the German Model: the 
Negative Relationship Between Ownership Concentration and Stock Market 
Returns, 1997–2001. Economic Geography. 81(1), 11-29. 
Clarke, T. (2004). Theories of Corporate Governance: The Philosophical 
Foundations of Corporate Governance. London: Routledge Taylor & Francis 
Group. 
  
242 
Clinch, G., and Verrecchia, R. E. (2015). Voluntary Disclosure and the Cost of 
Capital. Australian Journal of Management. 40(2), 201-223. 
Cohen, J., Gaynor, L. M., Krishnamoorthy, G., and Wright, A. M. (2007). Auditor 
Communications with the Audit Committee and the Board of Directors: 
Policy Recommendations and Opportunities for Future Research. Accounting 
Horizons. 21(2), 165-187. 
Coleman, A. D., Esho, N., and Wong, M. (2006). The Impact of Agency Costs on the 
Investment Performance of Australian Pension Funds. Journal of Pension 
Economics and Finance. 5(03), 299-324. 
Collier, P. A. (1993). Audit Committees in Major UK Companies. Managerial 
Auditing Journal. 8(3), 25-30. 
Committee, C. (1992). Report on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance. 
Gee, London, 15. 
Conger, J. A., Finegold, D., and Lawler, E. (1998). Appraising Boardroom 
Performance. Harvard Business Review. 76, 136-164. 
Cornaggia, K. R., Krishnan, G. V., and Wang, C. J. (2015). Managerial Ability, 
Credit Ratings, and the Cost of Debt. Available at 
:http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2541699. 
Cornelius, P. (2005). Good Corporate Practices in Poor Corporate Governance 
Systems: Some Evidence from the Global Competitiveness Report. 
Corporate Governance. 5(3), 12-23. 
COSO. (1992). Internal control- Integrated Framework. 
COSO. (2004). Enterprise Risk Management- Integrated Framework. 
Coughlan, A. T., and Schmidt, R. M. (1985). Executive Compensation, Management 
Turnover, and Firm Performance: An Empirical Investigation. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics. 7(1), 43-66. 
Craswell, A. T., Francis, J. R., and Taylor, S. L. (1995). Auditor Brand Name 
Reputations and Industry Specializations. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics. 20(3), 297-322. 
  
243 
Cremers, K., and Nair, V. B. (2005). Governance Mechanisms and Equity Prices. 
The Journal of Finance. 60(6), 2859-2894. 
Creswell, J. W. (2003). Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed 
methods approaches 2nd ed. United States : Sage Publications, Incorporated. 
Dahlstrom, R., and Nygaard, A. (1996). An Exploratory Investigation of 
Interpersonal Trust in New and Mature Market Economies. Journal of 
Retailing. 71(4), 339-361. 
Daily, C. M., Dalton, D. R., and Cannella, A. A. (2003). Corporate Governance: 
Decades of Dialogue and Data. Academy of Management Review. 28(3), 371-
382. 
Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., Certo, S. T., and Roengpitya, R. (2003). Meta-Analyses 
of Fnancial Performance and Equity:Fusion or Confusion? Academy of 
Management Journal. 46(1), 13-26. 
Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., Ellstrand, A. E., and Johnson, J. L. (1998). Meta-
Analytic Reviews of Board Composition, Leadership Structure, and Financial 
Performance. Strategic Management Journal. 19(3), 269-290. 
Damodaran, A. (2002). Inveatment Valuation : Tools and Techniques for 
Determining The Value of Any Asset ,2nd ed.: Hoboken,NJ:John Wiley & 
Sons. 
Dao, M., Huang, H.-W., and Zhu, J. (2013). The Effects of Audit Committee 
Members’ Age and Additional Directorships on the Cost of Equity Capital in 
the USA. European Accounting Review. 22(3), 607-643. 
de Fuentes, C., and Sierra, E. (2015). Industry Specialization and Audit Fees: a 
Meta-Analytic Approach. Academia Revista Latinoamericana de 
Administración. 28(3), 419-435. 
DeAngelo, L. E. (1981a). Auditor Independence,'Low Balling’, and Disclosure 
Regulation. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 3(2), 113-127. 
DeAngelo, L. E. (1981b). Auditor Size and Audit Quality. Journal of Accounting 
and Economics. 3(3), 183-199. 
  
244 
Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G., and Sweeney, A. P. (1996). Causes and Consequences 
of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement 
Actions by the SEC. Contemporary Accounting Research. 13(1), 1-36. 
DeFond, M. L., and Francis, J. R. (2005). Audit Research after Sarbanes-Oxley. 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory. 24(s-1), 5-30. 
DeFond, M. L., Hann, R. N., and Hu, X. (2005). Does the Market Value Financial 
Expertise on Audit Committees of Boards of Directors? Journal of 
Accounting Research. 43(2), 153-193. 
DeFond, M. L., and Jiambalvo, J. (1994). Debt Covenant Violation and Manipulation 
of Accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 17(1), 145-176. 
Deis Jr, D. R., and Giroux, G. (1996). The Effect of Auditor Changes on Audit Fees, 
Audit Hours, and Audit Quality. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy. 
15(1), 55-76. 
Demsetz, H., and Lehn, K. (1985). The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes 
and Consequences. The Journal of Political Economy. 93(6), 1155-1177. 
Denis, D. K., and McConnell, J. J. (2003). International Corporate Governance. 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 38(1), 1-36. 
DeZoort, F. T., Hermanson, D. R., Archambeault, D. S., and Reed, S. A. (2002). 
Audit Committee Effectiveness: A Synthesis of the Empirical Audit 
Committee Literature. Journal of Accounting Literature. 21, 38-75. 
DeZoort, F. T., and Salterio, S. E. (2001). The Effects of Corporate Governance 
Experience and Fnancial-Reporting and Audit Knowledge on Audit 
Committee Members' Judgments. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory. 
20(2), 31-47. 
Dhaliwal, D. S., Gleason, C. A., Heitzman, S., and Melendrez, K. D. (2008). Auditor 
Fees and Cost of Debt. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance. 23(1), 1-
22. 
Diamond, D. W., and Verrecchia, R. E. (1991). Disclosure, Liquidity, and the Cost 
of Capital. The journal of Finance. 46(4), 1325-1359. 
  
245 
Dimitropoulos, P. E., and Asteriou, D. (2010). The Effect of Board Composition on 
the Informativeness and Quality of Annual Earnings: Empirical Evidence 
from Greece. Research in International Business and Finance. 24(2), 190-
205. 
Donker, H., and Zahir, S. (2008). Towards an Impartial and Effective Corporate 
Governance Rating System. Corporate Governance. 8(1), 83-93. 
Donnelly, R., and Mulcahy, M. (2008). Board Structure, Ownership, and Voluntary 
Disclosure in Ireland. Corporate Governance: An International Review. 
16(5), 416-429. 
Dopuch, N., and King, R. R. (1991). The Impact of Mas on Auditors' Independence: 
An Experimental Markets Study. Journal of Accounting Research. 29, 60-98. 
Dopuch, N., and Simunic, D. (1980). The Nature of Competition in the Auditing 
Profession: a Descriptive and Normative View. Regulation and the 
Accounting Profession. 34(2), 283-289. 
Dopuch, N., and Simunic, D. (1982). Competition in Auditing: An Assessment. 
Fourth Symposium on auditing research. Urbana:University of Illinois:  401-
450. 
Doupnik, T. S., and Tsakumis, G. T. (2004). A Critical Review of Tests of Gray’s 
Theory of Cultural Relevance and Suggestions for Future Research. Journal 
of Accounting Literature. 23(1), 1-48. 
Drucker, P. F. (1954). The Practice of Management. New York: Harper & Row. 
Duff, A. (2004). Auditqual: Dimensions of Audit Quality. Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Scotland. 
Duffee, G. R. (1998). The Relation Between Treasury Yields and Corporate Bond 
Yield Spreads. The Journal of Finance. 53(6), 2225-2241. 
Dulewicz, V., and Herbert, P. (2008). Current Practice of FTSE 350 Boards 
Concerning the Appointment, Evaluation and Development of Directors, 
Boards and Committees Post the Combined Code. International Journal of 
Business Governance and Ethics. 4(1), 99-115. 
  
246 
Dunn, K. A., and Mayhew, B. W. (2004). Audit Firm Industry Specialization and 
Client Disclosure Quality. Review of Accounting Studies. 9(1), 35-58. 
Dunn, P. (2004). The Impact of Insider Power on Fraudulent Financial Reporting. 
Journal of Management. 30(3), 397-412. 
Dye, R. A. (2001). An Evaluation of “Essays on Disclosure” and the Disclosure 
Literature in Accounting. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 32(1), 181-
235. 
Easley, D., and O'hara, M. (2004). Information and the Cost of Capital. The Journal 
of Finance. 59(4), 1553-1583. 
Eichenseher, J. W., and Shields, D. (1985). Corporate Director Liability and 
Monitoring Preferences. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy. 4(1), 13-
31. 
Eisenberg, T., Sundgren, S., and Wells, M. T. (1998). Larger Board Size and 
Decreasing Firm Value in Small Firms. Journal of Financial Economics. 
48(1), 35-54. 
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review. Academy of 
Management Review. 14(1), 57-74. 
El-Faitouri, R. (2014). Board of Directors and Tobin’s Q: Evidence from UK Firms. 
Journal of Finance and Accounting. 2(4), 82-99. 
El Dahrawy, K. E. D. M., El Ghany, M. M. A., and Mohamed, O. M. F. (2015). The 
Effect of Accounting Information and Corporate Governance Mechanisms on 
Debt Covenants-An Applied Study on Firms Listed in the Egyptian Stock 
Market. Global Conference on Business & Finance Proceedings. Las Vegas, 
Nevada:  59-68. 
Elitzur, R., and Falk, H. (1996). Planned Audit Quality. Journal of Accounting and 
Public policy. 15(3), 247-269. 
Elloumi, F., and Gueyie, J.-P. (2001). Financial Distress and Corporate Governance: 
an Empirical Analysis. Corporate Governance. 1(1), 15-23. 
  
247 
Erhardt, N. L., Werbel, J. D., and Shrader, C. B. (2003). Board of Director Diversity 
and Firm Financial Performance. Corporate Governance: An International 
Review. 11(2), 102-111. 
Ertugrul, M., and Hegde, S. (2008). Board Compensation Practices and Agency 
Costs of Debt. Journal of Corporate Finance. 14(5), 512-531. 
Evans, J., Evans, R., and Loh, S. (2002). Corporate Governance and Declining Firms 
Performance. International Journal of Business Studies. 10(1), 1-35. 
Fama, E. F. (1980). Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm. The Journal of 
Political Economy. 88(2), 288-307. 
Fama, E. F., and French, K. R. (1992). The Cross Section of Expected Stock Returns. 
The Journal of Finance. 47(2), 427-465. 
Fama, E. F., and Jensen, M. C. (1983a). Agency Problems and Residual Claims. 
Journal of law and economics. 26(2), 327-349. 
Fama, E. F., and Jensen, M. C. (1983b). Separation of Ownership and Control. 
Journal of Law and Economics. 26(2), 301-325. 
Farinha, J. (2003). Corporate Governance: A Survey of the Literature Available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=470801. 
Farooq, O., and Derrabi, M. (2012). Effect of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on 
the Relationship Between Legal Origins and Cost of Debt: Evidence from the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region. African Journal of Business 
Management. 6(7), 2706-2715. 
Felo, A. J., Krishnamurthy, S., and Solieri, S. A. (2003). Audit Committee 
Characteristics and the Perceived Quality of Financial Reporting: An 
Empirical Analysis. Available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=401240. 
Felo, A. J., and Solieri, S. A. (2009). Are All Audit Committee Financial Experts 
Created Equally & Quest. International Journal of Disclosure and 
Governance. 6(2), 150-166. 
  
248 
Ferguson, A., Francis, J. R., and Stokes, D. J. (2003). The Effects of Firm-Wide and 
Office-Level Industry Expertise on Audit Pricing. The Accounting Review. 
78(2), 429-448. 
Ferguson, A., and Stokes, D. (2002). Brand Name Audit Pricing, Industry 
Specialization, and Leadership Premiums post‐Big 8 and Big 6 Mergers. 
Contemporary Accounting Research. 19(1), 77-110. 
Fernando, G. D., Abdel-Meguid, A. M., and Elder, R. J. (2010). Audit Quality 
Attributes, Client Size and Cost of Equity Capital. Review of Accounting and 
Finance. 9(4), 363-381. 
Ferris, S. P., Jagannathan, M., and Pritchard, A. C. (2003). Too Busy to Mind the 
Business? Monitoring by Directors with Multiple Board Appointments. The 
Journal of Finance. 58(3), 1087-1112. 
Fich, E. M., and Shivdasani, A. (2007). Financial Fraud, Director Reputation, and 
Shareholder Wealth. Journal of Financial Economics. 86(2), 306-336. 
Firth, M. (1997). The Provision of Nonaudit Services by Accounting Firms to their 
Audit Clients. Contemporary Accounting Research. 14(2), 1-21. 
Francis, J., LaFond, R., Olsson, P., and Schipper, K. (2005). The Market Pricing of 
Accruals Quality. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 39(2), 295-327. 
Francis, J., LaFond, R., Olsson, P. M., and Schipper, K. (2004). Costs of Equity and 
Earnings Attributes. The Accounting Review. 79(4), 967-1010. 
Francis, J., Nanda, D., and Olsson, P. (2008). Voluntary Disclosure, Earnings 
Quality, and Cost of Capital. Journal of Accounting Research. 46(1), 53-99. 
Francis, J. R. (2004). What Do We Know About Audit Quality? The British 
Accounting Review. 36(4), 345-368. 
Francis, J. R., Khurana, I. K., and Pereira, R. (2005). Disclosure Incentives and 
Effects on Cost of Capital Around the World. The Accounting Review. 80(4), 
1125-1162. 
Friedman, M. (1957). A Theory of the Consumption. Princeton University Press 
Princeton. 
  
249 
Froot, K. A. (1989). Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimation with Cross-Sectional 
Dependence and Heteroskedasticity in Financial Data. Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis. 24(3), 333-355. 
Funchal, B., Galdi, F. C., and Lopes, A. B. (2008). Interactions Between Corporate 
Governance, Bankruptcy Law and Firms' Debt Financing: the Brazilian Case. 
BAR. Brazilian Administration Review. 5(3), 245-259. 
Gendron, Y., and Bedard, J. (2004). The Construction of Audit Committee 
Effectiveness: A Field Study in Canadian Public Corporations. Auditing: A 
Journal of Practice and Theory. 
Gendron, Y., and Bedard, J. (2006). On the Constitution of Audit Committee 
Effectiveness. Accounting, Organizations and Society. 31(3), 211-239. 
Gendron, Y., Bédard, J., and Gosselin, M. (2004). Getting Inside the Black Box: A 
Field Study of Practices in “Effective” Audit Committees. Auditing: A 
Journal of Practice & Theory. 23(1), 153-171. 
Gersick, K. E. (1997). Generation to Generation: Life Cycles of the Family Business. 
Harvard Business School Press, Boston. 
Gietzmann, M., and Ireland, J. (2005). Cost of Capital, Strategic Disclosures and 
Accounting Choice. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting. 32(3‐4), 
599-634. 
Gietzmann, M. B., and Trombetta, M. (2003). Disclosure Interactions: Accounting 
Policy Choice and Voluntary Disclosure Effects on the Cost of Raising 
Outside Capital. Accounting and Business Research. 33(3), 187-205. 
Gilson, S. C. (1989). Management Turnover and Financial Distress. Journal of 
Financial Economics. 25(2), 241-262. 
Goh, B. W. (2009). Audit Committees, Boards of Directors, and Remediation of 
Material Weaknesses in Internal Control. Contemporary Accounting 
Research. 26(2), 549-579. 
Goldman, A., and Barlev, B. (1974). The Auditor-Firm Conflict of Interests: Its 
Implications for Independence. The Accounting Review. 49(4), 707-718. 
  
250 
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., and Metrick, A. (2003). Corporate Governance and Equity 
Prices. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 118(1), 107-156. 
Grace, M., Ireland, A., and Dunstan, K. (1995). Board Composition, Non-Executive 
Directors' Characteristics and Corporate Financial Performance. Asia-Pacific 
Journal of Accounting. 2(1), 121-137. 
Gramling, A. A., and Stone, D. N. (2001). Audit Firm Industry Expertise: A Review 
and Synthesis of the Archival Literature. Journal of Accounting Literature. 
20, 1-29. 
Gravetter, F., and Wallnau, L. (2009). Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences, 8th ed. 
United States of Anerica: Wadsworth,Cengage Lerning  
Gray, R., Kouhy, R., and Lavers, S. (1995). Corporate Social and Environmental 
Reporting: a Review of the Literature and a Longitudinal Study of UK 
Disclosure. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal. 8(2), 47-77. 
Gray, S. (1988). Towards a Theory of Cultural Influence on Development of 
International Accounting Systems. Abacus 24(1), 1-15. 
Groeneveld, R. A., and Meeden, G. (1984). Measuring Skewness and Kurtosis. The 
Statistician. 33(4), 391-399. 
Guba, E. G., and Lincoln, Y. S. (1994). Competing Paradigms in Qualitative 
Research, Handbook of Qualitative Research. Thousand Oaks CA: SAGE. 
Gujarati, D. N. (2003). Basic Econometrics. 4th. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Gul, F., Min, C., and Srinidhi, B. (2010). Gender Diversity on US Corporate Boards 
and Cost of Capital. Working paper, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University. 
Gul, F. A. (2006). Auditors' Response to Political Connections and Cronyism in 
Malaysia. Journal of Accounting Research. 44(5), 931-963. 
Gul, F. A., and Tsui, J. S. (2001). Free Cash Flow, Debt Monitoring, and Audit 
Pricing: Further Evidence on the Role of Director Equity Ownership. 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory. 20(2), 71-84. 
Güner, A. B., Malmendier, U., and Tate, G. (2008). Financial Expertise of Directors. 
Journal of Financial Economics. 88(2), 323-354. 
  
251 
Hail, L., and Leuz, C. (2006). International differences in the cost of equity capital: 
Do legal institutions and securities regulation matter? Journal of Accounting 
Research. 44(3), 485-531. 
Hair, J., Black, W., Babin, B., and Anderson, R. (2010). Multivariate Data Analysis: 
A Global Perspective, 7th ed. Prentice-Hall, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey. 
Hair Jr, J. F., Hult, G. T. M., Ringle, C., and Sarstedt, M. (2013). A Primer on 
Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM). SAGE 
Publications, Incorporated. 
Hajiha, Z., and Sobhani, N. (2012). Audit Quality and Cost of Equity Capital: 
Evidence of Iran. International Research Journal of Finance and 
Economics(94), 159-171. 
Hambrick, D. C., and Mason, P. A. (1984). Upper Echelons: The Organization as a 
Reflection of its Top Managers. Academy of Management Review. 9(2), 193-
206. 
Hamid, S., Craig, R., and Clarke, F. (1993). Religion: a Confounding Cultural 
Element in the International Harmonization of Accounting? Abacus. 29(2), 
131-148. 
Hamilton, B. E., Martin, J. A., and Ventura, S. J. (2009). Births: Preliminary Data for 
2009. Working Paper. National Vital Statistics Reports, U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services. 
Hammersley, J. S. (2006). Pattern Identification and Industry-Specialist Auditors. 
The Accounting Review. 81(2), 309-336. 
Hampel. (1998). Committee on corporate governance: Final report. 
Haniffa, R., and Cooke, T. (2005). The Impact of Culture and Governance on 
Corporate Social Reporting. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy. 24(5), 
391-430. 
Haniffa, R. M., and Cooke, T. E. (2002). Culture, Corporate Governance and 
Disclosure in Malaysian Corporations. Abacus. 38(3), 317-349. 
Hann, R., Ogneva, M., and Ozbas, O. (2013). Corporate Diversification and the Cost 
of Capital. The Journal of Finance. 68(5), 1961–1999. 
  
252 
Harris, H. (1987). The Ca Antigen: Structure, Function and Clinical Application. 
Tumour Markers in Clinical Practice, 115-128. 
Hashim, H. A. (2012). The Influence of Culture on Financial Reporting Quality in 
Malaysia. Asian Social Science. 8(13), 192-200. 
Hermalin, B. E., and Weisbach, M. S. (1991). The Effects of Board Composition and 
Direct Incentives on Firm Performance. Financial Management. 20(4), 101-
112. 
Hermalin, B. E., and Weisbach, M. S. (2001). Boards of Directors as an 
Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review. 9, 7-26. 
Hillier, D., Linn, S. C., and McColgan, P. (2005). Equity Issuance, CEO Turnover 
and Corporate Governance. European Financial Management. 11(4), 515-
538. 
Hillman, A. J., and Dalziel, T. (2003). Boards of Directors and Firm Performance: 
Integrating Agency and Resource Dependence Perspectives. Academy of 
Management review. 28(3), 383-396. 
Hilmer, F. G. (1998). Strictly Boardroom 2nd ed. Melbourne: Information Australia. 
Hirshleifer, D., and Thakor, A. V. (1992). Managerial Conservatism, Project Choice, 
and Debt. Review of Financial Studies. 5(3), 437-470. 
Hofstede, G. (1980). Culture's Consequences: International Differences in Work-
Related Values. Sage Publications, Incorporated. 
Hofstede, G. (1983). National Cultures in Four Dimensions: A Research-Based 
Theory of Cultural Differences Among Nations. International Studies of 
Management & Organization. 13(1/2), 46-74. 
Hofstede, G. (1997). Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind. McGraw-
Hill International. 
Hogan, C. E., and Jeter, D. C. (1999). Industry Specialization by Auditors. Auditing: 
A Journal of Practice & Theory. 18(1), 1-17. 
Hoitash, R., Markelevich, A., and Barragato, C. A. (2007). Auditor Fees and Audit 
Quality. Managerial Auditing Journal. 22(8), 761-786. 
  
253 
Holland, L., and Foo, Y. B. (2003). Differences in Environmental Reporting 
Practices in the UK and the US: the Legal and Regulatory Context. The 
British Accounting Review. 35(1), 1-18. 
Hooghiemstra, R. (2000). Corporate Communication and Impression Management: 
New Perspectives Why Companies Engage in Corporate Social Reporting. 
Journal of Business Ethics. 27(1-2), 55-68. 
Hope, O.-K., Kang, T., Thomas, W. B., and Yoo, Y. K. (2009). Impact of Excess 
Auditor Remuneration on Cost of Equity Capital Around the World. Journal 
of Accounting, Auditing & Finance. 24(2), 177-210. 
Hope, O. K. (2003). Firm‐Level Disclosures and the Relative Roles of Culture and 
Legal Origin. Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting. 
14(3), 218-248. 
Howell, D. C. (2011). Fundamental Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences 7th ed. 
USA:Linda Schreiber. 
Huang, H.-W., Mishra, S., and Raghunandan, K. (2007). Types of Nonaudit Fees and 
Financial Reporting Quality. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory. 
26(1), 133-145. 
Huang, H. H., and Wu, S. (2010). Individual Shareholder Rights Provisions and Cost 
of Capital. International Journal of Law and Management. 52(6), 415-428. 
Huguet, D., and Gandía, J. (2014). Cost of debt capital and audit in Spanish SMEs. 
Spanish Journal of Finance and Accounting. 43(3), 266-289. 
Hung, H. (1998). A Typology of the Theories of the Roles of Governing Boards. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review. 6(2), 101-111. 
Hussey, J., and Hussey, R. (1997). Business Research. Houndsmills: Macmillan  
Business. 
Hwang, L.-S., Kim, K.-T., and Kwak, S.-K. (2008). Auditor Switching, Earnings 
Quality, and the Cost of Debt Capital. Journal of Contemporary Accounting 
and Economics 2-40. 
Ittonen, K. (2010). A Theoretical Examination of the Role of Auditing and the 
Relevance of Audit Reports. Vaasan Yliopisto, Opetusjulkaisuja. 61. 
  
254 
Jensen, K. L., and Payne, J. L. (2005). Audit Procurement: Managing Audit Quality 
and Audit Fees in Response to Agency Costs. Auditing: A Journal of Practice 
& Theory. 24(2), 27-48. 
Jensen, M. C. (1986). Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and 
Takeovers. The American Economic Review. 76(2), 323-329. 
Jensen, M. C. (1993). The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of 
Internal Control Systems. The Journal of Finance. 48(3), 831-880. 
Jensen, M. C., and Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial 
Economics. 3(4), 305-360. 
Jesudason, J. V. (1989). Ethnicity and the Economy: The State, Chinese Business, 
and Multinationals in Malaysia. USA: Oxford University Press. 
Jiraporn, P., and Chintrakarn, P. (2009). Staggered Boards, Managerial 
Entrenchment, and Dividend Policy. Journal of Financial Services Research. 
36(1), 1-19. 
John, K., and Senbet, L. W. (1998). Corporate Governance and Board Effectiveness. 
Journal of Banking & Finance. 22(4), 371-403. 
Johnson, J. L., Daily, C. M., and Ellstrand, A. E. (1996). Boards of Directors: A 
Review and ResearchAgenda. Journal of Management. 22(3), 409-438. 
Jow, W. Y., Loo, S. C., Zainal Abidin, S., Noordin, A., and Ariffin, B. (2007). 
Earnings Management Practices Between Government Linked And Chinese 
Family Linked Companies. International Journal of Economics and 
Management. 1(3), 387-406. 
Karamanou, I., and Vafeas, N. (2005). The Association Between Corporate Boards, 
Audit Committees, and Management Earnings Forecasts: An Empirical 
Analysis. Journal of Accounting Research. 43(3), 453-486. 
Karjalainen, J. (2008). Auditor Choice and Cost of Debt Financing for Private SMEs. 
Working Paper,The Pennsylvania State University. 
Karjalainen, J. (2011). Audit Quality and Cost of Debt Capital for Private Firms: 
Evidence from Finland. International Journal of Auditing. 15(1), 88-108. 
  
255 
Keasey, K., Thompson, S., and Wright, M. (2005). Corporate Governance: 
Accountability, Enterprise and International Comparisons. London: Wiley 
Press. 
Kenyon-Rouvinez, D., and Ward, J. L. (2004). Family Business: Key Issues. 
Palgrave Macmillan, New York. 
Keown, A. J., Petty, J. W., Scott, D. F., and Martin, J. D. (2001). Foundations of 
Finance: The Logic And Practice of Financial Management (3rd ed.). N.J: 
Prentice Hall. 
Khaddafi, M. (2015). Effect of Debt Default, Audit Quality and Acceptance of Audit 
Opinion Going Concern in Manufacturing Company in Indonesia Stock 
Exchange. International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, 
Finance and Management Sciences. 5(1), 80-91. 
Kholbadalov, U. (2012). The Relationship of Corporate Tax Avoidance, Cost of 
Debt and Institutional Ownership: Evidence from Malaysia. Atlantic Review 
of Economics. 2, 1-35. 
Kim, J. B., Simunic, D. A., Stein, M. T., and Yi, C. H. (2011). Voluntary Audits and 
the Cost of Debt Capital for Privately Held Firms: Korean Evidence. 
Contemporary Accounting Research. 28(2), 585-615. 
Klapper, L. F., and Love, I. (2004). Corporate Governance, Investor Protection, and 
Performance in Emerging Markets. Journal of Corporate Finance. 10(5), 
703-728. 
Klein, A. (1998). Firm Performance and Board Committee Structure 1. The Journal 
of Law and Economics. 41(1), 275-304. 
Klein, A. (2002a). Audit Committee, Board of Director Characteristics, and Earnings 
Management. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 33(3), 375-400. 
Klein, A. (2002b). Economic Determinants of Audit Committee Independence. The 
Accounting Review. 77(2), 435-452. 
Klock, M. S., Mansi, S. A., and Maxwell, W. F. (2005). Does Corporate Governance 
Matter to Bondholders? Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 
40(4), 693-719. 
  
256 
Koenker, R. (2005). Quantile Regression. UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Koerniadi, H., and Tourani-Rad, A. (2011). Corporate Governance, Financing 
Patterns and the Cost of Capital: Evidence from New Zealand Companies. 
Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1969584. 
Kogan, N., and Wallach, M. A. (1966). Modification of a Judgmental Style Through 
Group Interaction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 4(2), 165. 
Koh, P. S., Laplante, S. K., and Tong, Y. H. (2007). Accountability and Value 
Enhancement Roles of Corporate Governance. Accounting & Finance. 47(2), 
305-333. 
Koren, J., Kosi, U., and Valentincic, A. (2014). Does Financial Statement Audit 
Reduce the Cost of Debt of Private Firms? Available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2373987. 
Krishnan, G., and Visvanathan, G. (2009). Do Auditors Price Audit Committee's 
Expertise? The Case of Accounting Versus Nonaccounting Financial Experts. 
Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance. 24(1), 115-144. 
Krishnan, G. V., and Visvanathan, G. (2008). Does the SOX Definition of an 
Accounting Expert Matter? The Association between Audit Committee 
Directors' Accounting Expertise and Accounting Conservatism. 
Contemporary Accounting Research. 25(3), 827-858. 
Krishnan, J., and Lee, J. E. (2009). Audit Committee Financial Expertise, Litigation 
Risk, and Corporate Governance. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory. 
28(1), 241-261. 
Lai, K.-W. (2011). The Cost of Debt When All-Equity Firms Raise Sfinance: The 
Role of Investment Opportunities, Audit Quality and Debt Maturity. Journal 
of Banking & Finance. 35(8), 1931-1940. 
Lambert, R., Leuz, C., and Verrecchia, R. E. (2007). Accounting Information, 
Disclosure, and the Cost of Capital. Journal of Accounting Research. 45(2), 
385-420. 
Langan, R., F., Jr. (2003). Prohibited Non-Audit Services. Corporate Responsibility 
Alerts Developments in the Law of Corporate Governance, Publication of 
  
257 
Nixon Peabody LLP. Available at 
http://www.nixonpeabody.com/files/CRA_06162003.pdf. 
Lara, J. M. G., Osma, B. G., and Penalva, F. (2009). Accounting Conservatism and 
Corporate Governance. Review of Accounting Studies. 14(1), 161-201. 
Larcker, D. F., and Richardson, S. A. (2004). Fees Paid to Audit Firms, Accrual 
Choices, and Corporate Governance. Journal of Accounting Research. 42(3), 
625-658. 
Larcker, D. F., and Rusticus, T. O. (2010). On the Use of Instrumental Variables in 
Accounting Research. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 49(3), 186-205. 
Lebar, M. A. (1982). A General Semantics Analysis of Selected Sections of the 10-k, 
the Annual Report to Shareholders, and the Financial Press Release. 
Accounting Review. 57(1), 176-189. 
Lee, T., and Stone, M. (1997). Economic Agency and Audit Committees: 
Responsibilities and Membership Composition. International Journal of 
Auditing. 1(2), 97-116. 
Lemmon, M. L., and Lins, K. V. (2003). Ownership Structure, Corporate 
Governance, and Firm Value: Evidence from the East Asian Financial Crisis. 
The Journal of Finance. 58(4), 1445-1468. 
Letendre, L. (2004). The Dynamics of the Boardroom. The Academy of Management 
Executive. 18(1), 101-104. 
Leuz, C., and Verrecchia, R. E. (2005). Firms' Capital Allocation Choices, 
Information Quality and the Cost of Capital. Working Paper, University of 
Pennsylvania. 
Li, C., Xie, Y., and Zhou, J. (2010). National Level, City Level Auditor Industry 
Specialization and Cost of Debt. Accounting Horizons. 24(3), 395-417. 
Lim, Y. (2011). Tax Avoidance, Cost of Debt and Shareholder Activism: Evidence 
from Korea. Journal of Banking & Finance. 35(2), 456-470. 
Limpabandh, P., and Issarawomrawanich, P. (2013). The Association between 
Corporate Governance Mechanisms Related to Board of Directors’ 
  
258 
Characteristics and Cost of Capital: Empirical Evidence from Thailand. The 
14th FourA  Annual Conference 2013, Penang, Malaysia, October 28-30. 
Limpaphayom, J., and Connelly, P. (2006). Board Characteristics and Firm 
Performance: Evidence from the Life Insurance Industry in Thailand. Journal 
of Economics. 16(2), 101-124. 
Lin, J. W., Li, J. F., and Yang, J. S. (2006). The Effect of Audit Committee 
Performance on Earnings Quality. Managerial Auditing Journal. 21(9), 921-
933. 
Lin, Y.-f., Yeh, Y. M. C., and Yang, F.-m. (2014). Supervisory Quality of Board and 
Firm Performance: A Perspective of Board Meeting Attendance. Total 
Quality Management & Business Excellence. 25(3-4), 264-279. 
Lipton, M., and Lorsch, J. W. (1992). A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate 
Governance. The Business Lawyer. 48(1), 59-77. 
Littlejohn, S. W. (1983). Theories of Human Communication. (2 nd ed.). Belmont, 
California: Wadsworth Publishing Company. 
Lorca, C., Sánchez-Ballesta, J. P., and García-Meca, E. (2011). Board Effectiveness 
and Cost of Debt. Journal of Business Ethics. 100(4), 613-631. 
Lou, Y., and Vasvari, F. P. (2009). Auditor Specialization and the Cost of Public 
Debt. Working Paper,London Business School. 
Low, K.-Y. (2004). The Effects of Industry Specialization on Audit Risk 
Assessments and Audit-Planning Decisions. The Accounting Review. 79(1), 
201-219. 
Luecke, R., and Westfall, L. (1990). Do You Need an Audit Committee? Trustee. 
43(8), 14, 17. 
Macey, J. R. (1997). Institutional Investors and Corporate Monitoring: A Demand‐
Side Perspective. Managerial and Decision Economics. 18(7‐8), 601-610. 
Maddala, G. S. (2001). Introduction to Econometrics. (3 rd ed.). Chichester: John 
Wiley & Sons, Limited. 
Magee, R. P., and Tseng, M.-C. (1990). Audit Pricing and Independence. Accounting 
Review. 65(2), 315-336. 
  
259 
Malek, M., and Saidin, S. F. (2013). Audit Services Fee, Non-Audit Services and the 
Reliability of Earnings. International Journal of Trade, Economics and 
Finance. 4(5), 259-264. 
Mamman, A. (2002). Managerial Views on Government Intervention in Malaysia: 
The Relevance of Ethnic and Employment Backgrounds. Asia Pacific 
Business Review. 9(1), 1-20. 
Mangena, M., and Pike, R. (2005). The Effect of Audit Committee Shareholding, 
Financial Expertise and size on Interim Financial Disclosures. Accounting 
and Business Research. 35(4), 327-349. 
Mattessich, R. (1964). Accounting and Analytical Methods: Measurement and 
Projection of Income and Wealth in the Micro-and Macro-Economy. 
Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc. 
Mautz, R., and Neumann, F. (1970). The Effective Corporate Audit Committee. 
Harvard Business Review. 48(6), 57-65. 
Mayhew, B. W., and Wilkins, M. S. (2003). Audit Firm Industry Specialization as a 
Differentiation Strategy: Evidence from Fees Charged to Firms Going Public. 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory. 22(2), 33-52. 
Mazzotta, R., and Veltri, S. (2014). The Relationship Between Corporate 
Governance and the Cost of Equity Capital. Evidence from the Italian Stock 
Exchange. Journal of Management & Governance. 18(2), 419-448. 
MCCG. (2000). Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance Available at 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/mccg_mar2000.pdf. 
MCCG. (2007). Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance. Available at 
http://www.sc.com.my/eng/html/cg/cg2007.pdf. 
MCCG. (2012). Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance Available at 
http://www.sc.com.my/wp-content/uploads/eng/html/cg/cg2012.pdf. 
McMullen, D. A., and Raghunandan, K. (1996). Enhancing Audit Committee 
Effectiveness. Journal of Accountancy. 182(2), 79-81. 
Mednick, R. (1990). Independence: Let’s Get Back to Basics. Journal of 
Accountancy. 169(1), 86-93. 
  
260 
Menon, K., and Deahl Williams, J. (1994). The Use of Audit Committees for 
Monitoring. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy. 13(2), 121-139. 
Merchant, K. A., Chow, C. W., and Wu, A. (1995). Measurement, Evaluation and 
Reward of Profit Center Managers: a Cross-Cultural Field Study. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society. 20(7), 619-638. 
Michaelas, N., Chittenden, F., and Poutziouris, P. (1999). Financial Policy and 
Capital Structure Choice in UK SMEs: Empirical Evidence from Company 
Panel Data. Small Business Economics. 12(2), 113-130. 
Miller, M. H. (1977). Debt and Taxes. The Journal of Finance. 32(2), 261-275. 
Miller, S. E. (2009). Governance Mechanisms as Moderators of Agency Costs in a 
Pre-SOX Environment. Journal of Business & Economics Research 7(10), 
15-31. 
Minton, B. A., Taillard, J. P., and Williamson, R. (2014). Financial Expertise of the 
Board, Risk Taking and Performance: Evidence from Bank Holding 
Companies. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 49(2), 351–380. 
Modigliani, F., and Miller, M. H. (1958). The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance 
and the Theory of Investment. The American Economic Review. 48(3), 261-
297. 
Mohd Ghazali, N. A. (2004). Exploring Theortical Explanations of Voluntary 
Disclosure by Quantitative and Qualitative Investigation: Evidence from 
Malaysia. Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Strathclyde, UK. 
Mohd Ghazali, N. A., and Weetman, P. (2006). Perpetuating traditional influences: 
Voluntary disclosure in Malaysia following the economic crisis. Journal of 
International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation. 15(2), 226-248. 
Mohid Rahmat, M., Mohd Iskandar, T., and Mohd Saleh, N. (2009). Audit 
Committee Characteristics in Financially Distressed and Non-Distressed 
Companies. Managerial Auditing Journal. 24(7), 624-638. 
Moizer, P. (1997). Auditor Reputation: The International Empirical Evidence. 
International Journal of Auditing. 1(1), 61-74. 
  
261 
Monks, R., and Minow, N. (1995). Corporate Governance. Blackwell Business, 
Cambridge, MA. 
Monks, R., and Minow, N. (2008). Corporate governance. West Sussex, UK: John 
Wiley. 
Morris, R. D. (1987). Signalling, Agency Theory and Accounting Policy Choice. 
Accounting and Business Research. 18(69), 47-56. 
Muijs, D. (2004). Doing Quantitative Research in Education with SPSS. 
London:Sage Publications Lnc. 
Mustafa, S. T., and Youssef, N. B. (2010). Audit Committee Financial Expertise and 
Misappropriation of Assets. Managerial Auditing Journal. 25(3), 208-225. 
Myers, S. C. (1977). Determinants of Corporate Borrowing. Journal of Financial 
Economics. 5(2), 147-175. 
Myers, S. C. (2001). Capital Structure. Journal of Economic perspectives. 15(2), 81-
102. 
Nam, S. (2006). The Impact of Non-Audit Services on Capital Markets. Available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=693422. 
Neal, T. L., and Riley Jr, R. R. (2004). Auditor Industry Specialist Research Design. 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory. 23(2), 169-177. 
Neuman, W. L. (1997). Social Research Methods: Quantitative and Qualitative 
Approaches. (3rd ed.). Needham Heights, MA: Allyn and Bacon Boston. 
Niemi, L. (2004). Auditor Size and Audit Pricing: Evidence from Small Audit Firms. 
European Accounting Review. 13(3), 541-560. 
Njuguna, L., and Moronge, M. (2013). Influence of the Managerial Behavior of 
Agency Cost on the Performance of Listed Firms on NSE. International 
Journal of Social Sciences and Entrepreneurship. 1(7), 397-410. 
Noor, M. A. M., and Fadzil, F. H. (2013). Board Characteristics and Performance 
from Perspective of Governance Code in Malaysia. World Review of Business 
Research. 3(3), 191-206. 
North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. 
Cambridge University Press. 
  
262 
North, D. C. (1994). Economic Performance Through Time. The American 
Economic Review. 84(3), 359-368. 
North, D. C. (2005). Understanding the Process of Economic Change. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Norziaton, I., Devi, S. S., and Meng, C. W. (2015). Audit Committee and Audit Fees 
in Malaysia: The Moderating Role of Political Connection. Journal of 
Management Research. 7(2), 530-547. 
Nouira, A., and Bacha, S. (2014). Corporate Governance Mechanisms and the Cost 
of Debt: Evidence from Tunisian Context. The Business & Management 
Review. 5(1), 293-303. 
O'Reilly III, C. A., Caldwell, D. F., and Barnett, W. P. (1989). Work Group 
Demography, Social Integration, and Turnover. Administrative Science 
Quarterly. 34(1), 21-37. 
OECD. (2004). Principles of Corporate Governance 2004. OECD Publishing. 
OKeefe, T. B., King, R. D., and Gaver, K. M. (1994). Audit Fees, Industry 
Specialization, and Compliance with GAAS Reporting Standards. Auditing-A 
Journal of Practice & Theory. 13(2), 41-55. 
Ow Yong, K., and Kooi Guan, C. (2000). Corporate Governance Codes: A 
Comparison Between Malaysia and the UK. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review. 8(2), 125-132. 
Owens-Jackson, L. A., Robinson, D., and Waller Shelton, S. (2009). The Association 
between Audit Committee Characteristics, the Contracting Process and 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting. American Journal of Business. 24(1), 57-66. 
Owhoso, V. E., Messier Jr, W. F., and Lynch Jr, J. G. (2002). Error Detection by 
Industry‐Specialized Teams during Sequential Audit Review. Journal of 
Accounting Research. 40(3), 883-900. 
Paige Fields, L., Fraser, D. R., and Subrahmanyam, A. (2012). Board Quality and the 
Cost of Debt Capital: The Case of Bank Loans. Journal of Banking & 
Finance. 36(5), 1536-1547. 
  
263 
Paligorova, T., and Yang, J. (2011). Corporate Governance, Product Market 
Competition, and the Cost of Debt Financing. China International 
Conference in Finance, July 4-7, Shangri-La Hotel, Wuhan, China. 
Palmrose, Z.-V. (1986). Audit Fees and Auditor Size: Further Evidence. Journal of 
Accounting Research. 24(1), 97-110. 
Palmrose, Z.-V. (1988). Competitive Manuscript Co-Winner: An Analysis of 
Auditor Litigation and Audit Service Quality. Accounting Review. 63(1), 55-
73. 
Pany, K., and Reckers, P. M. (1983). Auditor Independence and Nonaudit Services: 
Director Views and Their Policy Implications. Journal of Accounting and 
Public Policy. 2(1), 43-62. 
Parkash, M., and Venable, C. F. (1993). Auditee Incentives for Auditor 
Independence: The Case of Nonaudit Services. Accounting Review. 68(1), 
113-133. 
Patton, M. Q. (1990). Qualitative Evaluation and Eesearch Methods. (2 nd ed.). 
Beverly Hills, California: SAGE Publications. 
PCAOB. (2008). Public Company Accounting Oversight Board ,Discussion- 
Treasury Advisory Committee‟s Recommendation Relating to the Feasibility 
of Developing Key Indicators of Audit Quality and Effectiveness,available at 
http://pcaobus.org/News/Events/Documents/10222008_SAGMeeting/BP_Fea
sability_AQI.pdf  
Peasnell, K., Pope, P., and Young, S. (2006). Do Outside Directors Limit Earnings 
Management? Corporate Finance Review. 10(5), 5-10. 
Peasnell, K. V., Pope, P., and Young, S. (2000). Accrual Management to Meet 
Earnings Targets: UK Evidence Pre-and Post-Cadbury. The British 
Accounting Review. 32(4), 415-445. 
Peasnell, K. V., Pope, P. F., and Young, S. (2005). Board Monitoring and Earnings 
Management: Do Outside Directors Influence Abnormal Accruals? Journal 
of Business Finance & Accounting. 32(7‐8), 1311-1346. 
  
264 
Peel, M. J., and O'Donnell, E. (1995). Board Structure, Corporate Performance and 
Auditor Independence. Corporate Governance: An International Review. 
3(4), 207-217. 
Pergola, T. M. (2005). Management Entrenchment: Can It Negate the Effectiveness 
of Recently Legislated Governance Reform. Journal of American Academy of 
Business. 6(2), 177-183. 
Peters. (1997). Recommendations on Corporate Governance in the Netherlands. 
Petersen, M. A., and Rajan, R. G. (1994). The Benefits of Lending Relationships: 
Evidence from Small Business Data. The Journal of Finance. 49(1), 3-37. 
Pettigrew, A. M. (1979). On Studying Organizational Cultures. Administrative 
Science Quarterly. 24(4), 570-581. 
Pham, P. K., Suchard, J. A., and Zein, J. (2012). Corporate Governance and the Cost 
of Capital: Evidence from Australian Companies. Journal of Applied 
Corporate Finance. 24(3), 84-93. 
Pincus, K., Rusbarsky, M., and Wong, J. (1990). Voluntary Formation of Corporate 
Audit Committees Among NASDAQ Firms. Journal of Accounting and 
Public Policy. 8(4), 239-265. 
Piot, C., and Missonier-Piera, F. (2007). Corporate Governance, Audit Quality and 
the Cost of Debt Financing of French Listed Companies. Working paper, 
CERAG and Pierre Mendes France University. 
Pittman, J. A., and Fortin, S. (2004). Auditor Choice and the Cost of Debt Capital for 
Newly Public Firms. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 37(1), 113-136. 
POB. (1979). Public Oversight Board. Scope of Service by CPA firms, 16-21. 
Porter, B. A., and Gendall, P. J. (1998). Audit Committees in Private and Public 
Sector Corporates in New Zealand: An Empirical Investigation. International 
Journal of Auditing. 2(1), 49-69. 
Pratt, S. P., and Grabowski, R. J. (2008). Cost of Capitall: Applications and 
Examples. 3rd Edition John Wiley & Sons. 
  
265 
Quick, R., and Warming‐Rasmussen, B. (2009). Auditor Independence and the 
Provision of Non‐Audit Services: Perceptions by German Investors. 
International Journal of Auditing. 13(2), 141-162. 
Raedy, K. M., and Helms, G. L. (2002). CPA Involvement with Quarterly Financial 
Reporting. Ohio CPA Journal, Columbus. 61(3), 50-53. 
Raghunandan, K., and Rama, D. V. (2007). Determinants of Audit Committee 
Diligence. Accounting Horizons. 21(3), 265-279. 
Raghunandan, K., Rama, D. V., and Read, W. J. (2001). Audit Committee 
Composition,Gray Directors, and Interaction with Internal Auditing. 
Accounting Horizons. 15(2), 105-118. 
Rahaman, M. M., and Zaman, A. A. (2013). Management Quality and the Cost of 
Debt: Does Management Matter to Lenders? Journal of Banking & Finance. 
37(3), 854–874. 
Rahman, R. A., and Ali, F. H. M. (2006). Board, Audit Committee, Culture and 
Earnings Management: Malaysian Evidence. Managerial Auditing Journal. 
21(7), 783-804. 
Rajan, R. G. (1992). Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice Between Informed and 
Arm's‐Length Debt. The Journal of Finance. 47(4), 1367-1400. 
Ralston, D. A., Gustafson, D. J., Cheung, F. M., and Terpstra, R. H. (1993). 
Differences in Managerial Values: A Study of US, Hong Kong and PRC 
Managers. Journal of International Business Studies. 24(2), 249-275. 
Ramly, Z. (2012). Impact of Corporate Governance Quality on the Cost of Equity 
Capital in an Emerging Market: Evidence from Malaysian Listed Firms. 
African Journal of Business Management. 6(4), 1733-1748. 
Rediker, K. J., and Seth, A. (1995). Boards of Directors and Substitution Effects of 
Alternative Governance Mechanisms. Strategic Management Journal. 16(2), 
85-99. 
Regalli, M., and Soana, M.-G. (2012). Corporate Governance Quality and Cost of 
Equity in Financial Companies. International Journal of Business 
Administration. 3(2), 2-16. 
  
266 
Remenyi, D., Williams, B., Money, A., and Swartz, E. (1998). Doing Research in 
Business and Management. London, UK: SAGE. 
Reynolds, J. K., Deis Jr, D. R., and Francis, J. R. (2004). Professional Service Fees 
and Auditor Objectivity. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory. 23(1), 
29-52. 
Rezaee, Z., and Farmer, L. (1994). The Changing Role of the Audit Committee. 
Internal Auditing. 9(4), 10-20. 
Riahi-Belkaoui, A. (2000). Acounting Theory 4th Edition  London Business Press.  
Rittenberg, L. E., and Nair, R. D. (1992). Improving the Effectiveness of Audit 
Committees. Institute of Management Accountants, Montvale, NJ. 
Roberts, J., McNulty, T., and Stiles, P. (2005). Beyond Agency Conceptions of the 
Work of the Non‐Executive Director: Creating Accountability in the 
Boardroom. British Journal of Management. 16(s1), S5-S26. 
Robicheaux, S. H., Fu, X., and Ligon, J. A. (2007). Convertible Debt Use and 
Corporate Governance. Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics. 46(3), 
65-94. 
Rubin, A., and Segal, D. (2013). Directors Skill and Financial Reporting Quality. 
Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1928384. 
Rudestam, K. E., and Newton, R. R. (1992). Surviving Your Dissertation: A 
Comprehensive Guide to Content and Process. Newbury Park, UK: Sage 
Publications. 
Ryan, B., Scapens, R. W., and Theobald, M. (2002). Research Method and 
Methodology in Finance and Accounting. (2nd ed.). London: Thomson. 
Sah, R. K., and Stiglitz, J. E. (1988). Committees, Hierarchies and Polyarchies. The 
Economic Journal. 98(391), 451-470. 
Saleh, N. M., Iskandar, T. M., and Rahmat, M. M. (2007). Audit Committee 
Characteristics and Earnings Management: Evidence from Malaysia. Asian 
Review of Accounting. 15(2), 147-163. 
  
267 
Salleh, Z., Stewart, J., and Manson, S. (2006). The Impact of Board Composition and 
Ethnicity on Audit Quality: Evidence from Malaysian Companies. Malaysian 
Accounting Review. 5(2), 61-83. 
Salloum, C., Azzi, G., and Gebrayel, E. (2014). Audit Committee and Financial 
Distress in the Middle East Context: Evidence of the Lebanese Financial 
Institutions. International Strategic Management Review. 2(1), 39-45. 
Sandrick, K. (2007). Enhancing the Board's Role in Quality. Trustee. 60(1), 20-24. 
Saunders, M., Lewis, P., and Thornhill, A. (2003). Research Methods for Business 
Students. England: Essex, Pearson Education Limited. 
Saunders, M. N., Lewis, P., and Thornhill, A. (2007). Research Methods For 
Business Students, 3 ed. Essex: Prentice Hall, Pearson. 
Schauten, M., and Van Dijk, D. (2010). Corporate Governance and the Cost of Debt 
of Large European Firms. Erasmus Research Institute of Management 
(ERIM) Report Series Reference No. ERS-2010-025-F&A, available at 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/19679. 
Schauten, M. B. J. (2008). Valuation, Capital Structure Decisions and the Cost of 
Capital. Erasmus University Rotterdam, Erasmus Research Institute of 
Management (ERIM). 
Scheiner, J. H., and Kiger, J. E. (1982). An Empirical Investigation of Auditor 
Involvement in Non-Audit Services. Journal of Accounting Research. 20(2), 
482-496. 
Scott Jr, J. H. (1976). A Theory of Optimal Capital Structure. The Bell Journal of 
Economics. 7(1), 33-54. 
Seber, G. A., and Lee, A. J. (2012). Linear Regression Analysis. (Vol. 936): John 
Wiley & Sons. 
Sendut, H. (1991). Managing in a Multicultural Society–the Malaysian Experience. 
Malaysian Management Review. 26(1), 61-69. 
Sengupta, P. (1998). Corporate Disclosure Quality and the Cost of Debt. Accounting 
Review. 73(4), 459-474. 
  
268 
Shafie, R., Che Ahmad, A., and Md Ali, A. (2007). The Relationship Between Non-
Audit Service Fees and Audit Fees in the Banking Sector in Malaysia. 
International Journal of Management Studies 14(1), 61-87. 
Shamsher, M., and Zulkarnain, M. S. (2011). An Overview of Corporate 
Governance: Some Essentials. Available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1817091. 
Sharma, D. S., and Sidhu, J. (2001). Professionalism vs Commercialism: The 
Association Between Non‐Audit Services (NAS) and Audit Independence. 
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting. 28(5‐6), 563-594. 
Shivdasani, A. (1993). Board Composition, Ownership Structure, and Hostile 
Takeovers. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 16(1), 167-198. 
Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. W. (1997). A Survey of Corporate Governance. The 
Journal of Finance. 52(2), 737-783. 
Shokirjonovich, U. K. (2011). The Relationship of Corporate Tax Avoidance, Cost 
of Debt and Institutional Ownership: Evidence From Malaysia. Atlantic 
Review of Economics. 2, 1-36. 
Silvapulle, P. S., and Podivinsky, J. M. (2000). The Effect of Non-Normal 
Disturbances and Conditional Heteroskedasticity on Multiple Cointegration 
Tests. Journal of Statistical Computation and Simulation. 65(1-4), 173-189. 
Simunic, D. A. (1980). The Pricing of Audit Services: Theory and Evidence. Journal 
of Accounting Research. 18(1), 161-190. 
Simunic, D. A. (1984). Auditing, Consulting, and Auditor Independence. Journal of 
Accounting Research. 22(2), 679-702. 
Simunic, D. A., and Stein, M. T. (1987). Product Differentiation in Auditing: Auditor 
Choice in the Market for Unseasoned New Issues. Canadian Certified 
General Accountants’ Research Foundation, Vancouver British Columbia. 
Singh, H., and Harianto, F. (1989). Management-Board Relationships, Takeover 
Risk, and the Adoption of Golden Parachutes. Academy of Management 
Journal. 32(1), 7-24. 
  
269 
Singhal, A. (2014). Corporate Governance, Cost of Capital and Value Creation: 
Evidence from Indian Firms. IOSR Journal of Economics and Finance. 4(6), 
36-54. 
Smith, R. (2003). Audit Committees Combined Code Guidance (Smith Report). 
Financial Reporting Council Limited, London. 
Soha, T. M. (2011). Corporate Governance and Cost of Capital. International 
Journal of Governance. 1(1), 92-111. 
Solomon, I., Shields, M. D., and Whittington, O. R. (1999). What do Industry-
Specialist Auditors Know? Journal of Accounting Research. 37(1), 191-208. 
Soltani, B. (2007). Auditing: An International Approach. Financial Times, Prentice 
Hall, Pearson Education, UK. 
Song, J., and Windram, B. (2004). Benchmarking Audit Committee Effectiveness in 
Financial Reporting. International Journal of Auditing. 8(3), 195-205. 
SOX. (2002). Sarbanes-OxleyAct. Retrieved November 21, 2015, available at 
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/gwbush/sarbanesoxley072302.pdf. 
Specter, C. N., and Solomon, J. S. (1991). The Human Resource Factor in Chinese 
Management Reform. International Studies of Management and 
Organization. 20, 69-83. 
Spence, M. (1973). Job Market Signaling. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 
87(3), 355-374. 
Spence, M. (2002). Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of 
Markets. American Economic Review. 92(3), 434-459. 
Spira, L. F. (1999). Ceremonies of Governance: Perspectives on the Role of the 
Audit Committee. Journal of Management and Governance. 3(3), 231-260. 
Spira, L. F. (2002). The Audit Committee: Performing Corporate Governance. 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, London, UK. 
Spira, L. F. (2003). Audit Committees: Begging the Question? Corporate 
Governance: An International Review. 11(3), 180-188. 
  
270 
Srinidhi, B., and Gul, F. A. (2007). The Differential Effects of Auditors' Non-Audit 
and Audit Fees on Accrual Quality. Contemporary Accounting Research. 
24(2), 595–629. 
Stanton, P., and Stanton, J. (2002). Corporate Annual Reports: Research Perspectives 
Used. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal. 15(4), 478-500. 
Stulz, R. M., and Williamson, R. (2003). Culture, Openness, and Finance. Journal of 
Financial Economics. 70(3), 313-349. 
Subrahmanyam, A. (2008). Corporate Governance and Financial Markets. Corporate 
Ownership and Control. 5(3), 259-274. 
Sutton, S. G. (1993). Toward an Understanding of the Factors Affecting the Quality 
of the Audit Process. Decision Sciences. 24(1), 88-105. 
Sweeney, A. P. (1994). Debt-Covenant Violations and Managers' Accounting 
Responses. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 17(3), 281-308. 
Tabaksblat. (2003). Corporate Governance Committee : The Dutch Corporate 
Governance Code. 
Tanaka, T. (2014). Gender Diversity in the Boards and the Pricing of Publicly 
Traded Corporate Debt: Evidence from Japan. Applied Financial Economics. 
24(4), 247-258. 
Tauringana, V., and Chong, G. (2004). Neutrality of NarrativeDiscussion in Annual 
Reports of UK Listed Companies. Journal of Applied Accounting Research. 
7(1), 74-107. 
Tayeb, M. (1994). Organizations and National Culture: Methodology Considered. 
Organization Studies. 15(3), 429-445. 
Taylor, M. H. (2000). The Effects of Industry Specialization on Auditors' Inherent 
Risk Assessments and Confidence Judgements. Contemporary Accounting 
Research. 17(4), 693-712. 
Ticehurst, G. W., and Veal, A. J. (1999). Business Research Methods: A Managerial 
Approach. Australia: Addison Wesley Longman Australia Pty Limited. 
Tosi, H. L., and Greckhamer, T. (2004). Culture and CEO Compensation. 
Organization Science. 15(6), 657-670. 
  
271 
Tran, D. H. (2014). Multiple Corporate Governance Attributes and Cost of Capital , 
Evidence from Germany. The British Accounting Review. 46(2), 179–197. 
Turley, S., and Zaman, M. (2007). Audit Committee Effectiveness: Informal 
Processes and Behavioural Effects. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 
Journal. 20(5), 765-788. 
Turnbull. (1999). Internal control: Guidance for directors on the combined code. 
Upadhyay, A., and Sriram, R. (2011). Board Size, Corporate Information 
Environment and Cost of Capital. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting. 
38(9‐10), 1238-1261. 
Vafeas, N. (1999). Board Meeting Frequency and Firm Performance. Journal of 
Financial Economics. 53(1), 113-142. 
van Fossen, A. (1998). Race, ethnicity and language. Culture and Society in the Asia-
Pacific. 3, 89. 
Vance, S. C. (1983). Corporate Leadership: Boards, Directors, and Strategy. 
McGraw-Hill, New York. 
Vander Bauwhede, H., De Meyere, M., and Van Cauwenberge, P. (2015). Financial 
Reporting Quality and the Cost of Debt of SMEs. Small Business Economics. 
45(1), 149-164. 
Velury, U., Reisch, J. T., and O'Reilly, D. M. (2003). Institutional Ownership and the 
Selection of Industry Specialist Auditors. Review of Quantitative Finance and 
Accounting. 21(1), 35-48. 
Wahyuni, S. (2013). Whether Auditor Specialization Matters to Investor? Empirical 
Evidence from High Profile Industry in Indonesia. The 2nd IBSM, 
International Conference on Business and Mangement. Chiang Mai - 
Bangkok. 
Wallace, R., and Cooke, T. (1990). The Diagnosis and Resolution of Emerging 
Issues in Corporate Disclosure Practices. Accounting and Business Research. 
20(78), 143-151. 
  
272 
Wallace, W. A., and Ross, T. (1980). The economic role of the audit in free and 
regulated markets. Graduate School of Management, University of 
Rochester. 
Wallman, S. M. (1996). The Future of Accounting, Part III: Reliability and Auditor 
Independence. Accounting Horizons. 10(4), 76-97. 
Walsh, J. P., and Seward, J. K. (1990). On the Efficiency of Internal and External 
Corporate Control Mechanisms. Academy of Management Review. 15(3), 
421-458. 
Warga, A., and Welch, I. (1993). Bondholder Losses in Leveraged Buyouts. Review 
of Financial Studies. 6(4), 959-982. 
Watson, W. E., Kumar, K., and Michaelsen, L. K. (1993). Cultural Diversity's 
Impact on Interaction Process and Performance: Comparing Homogeneous 
and Diverse Task Groups. Academy of Management Journal. 36(3), 590-602. 
Watts, R., and Zimmerman, J. (1986). Positive Accounting Theory. Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Watts, R. L., and Zimmerman, J. L. (1983). Agency Problems, Auditing, and the 
Theory of the Firm: Some Evidence. Journal of Law and Economics. 26(3), 
613-633. 
Weber, J. (2006). Discussion of the Effects of Corporate Governance on Firms’ 
Credit Ratings. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 42(1), 245-254. 
Weisbach, M. S. (1988). Outside Directors and CEO Turnover. Journal of Financial 
Economics. 20, 431-460. 
Williams, R. (1963). Culture and Society. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Williams, R. (1983). Keywords London: Fontana. 
Williams, R. (2009). The Analysis of Culture’, in Cultural Theory and Popular 
Culture. 4th edn, edited by John Storey, Harlow: Pearson Education. 
Wilmshurst, T. D., and Frost, G. R. (2000). Corporate Environmental Eeporting: a 
Test of Legitimacy Theory. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal. 
13(1), 10-26. 
  
273 
Wolinsky, A. (1983). Prices as Signals of Product Quality. The Review of Economic 
Studies. 50(4), 647-658. 
Wolnizer, P. W. (1995). Are Audit Committees Red Herrings? Abacus. 31(1), 45-66. 
Woolridge, J. M. (2002). Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Wooten, T. C. (2003). Research About Audit Quality. The CPA Journal, available at 
http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2003/0103/dept/d014803.htm. 
Xie, B., Davidson, W. N., and DaDalt, P. J. (2003). Earnings Management and 
Corporate Governance: the Role of the Board and the Audit Committee. 
Journal of Corporate Finance. 9(3), 295-316. 
Yang, J. S., and Krishnan, J. (2005). Audit Committees and Quarterly Earnings 
Management. International Journal of Auditing. 9(3), 201-219. 
Yassin, F. M., and Nelson, S. P. (2012). Audit Committee and Internal Audit: 
Implications on Audit Quality. International Journal of Economics, 
Management and Accounting. 20(2), 187-218. 
Yatim, P., Kent, P., and Clarkson, P. (2006). Governance Structures, Ethnicity, and 
Audit Fees of Malaysian Listed Firms. Managerial Auditing Journal. 21(7), 
757-782. 
Yermack, D. (1996). Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of 
Directors. Journal of Financial Economics. 40(2), 185-211. 
Yermack, D. (2004). Remuneration, Retention, and Reputation Incentives for 
Outside Directors. The Journal of Finance. 59(5), 2281-2308. 
Yunos, R. M., Ismail, Z., and Smith, M. (2012). Ethnicity and Accounting 
Conservatism: Malaysian Evidence. Asian Review of Accounting. 20(1), 34-
57. 
Zahra, S. A., and Pearce, J. A. (1989). Boards of Directors and Corporate Financial 
Performance: A Review and Integrative Model. Journal of Management. 
15(2), 291-334. 
Zainol, S. S. B., Moorthy, M. K., and Arifin, T. R. B. T. (2012). Determinants of 
Non-Audit Services in Malaysia: A Theoretical Model. International Journal 
  
274 
of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences. 
2(3), 97-111. 
Zhu, F. (2012). Differential Effects of Corporate Governance on the Cost of Equity 
and Debt Capital: An International Study. Available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2160150. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
